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SHOOTING FOR AN OMNIPOTENT CONGRESS: THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF FEDERAL REGULATION
OF INTRASTATE FIREARMS POSSESSION
JAMES M. MALONEY*
INTRODUCTION
As 1993 drew to a close, two federal prosecutions for possession of
firearms on or near school grounds, pursuant to the Gun-Free School
Zones Act of 1990 (the "Act"),' resulted in a split between the Fifth and
Ninth Circuits on the question of the Act's constitutionality. On Sep-
tember 15, in United States v. Lopez,2 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit held the Act, in the full reach of its terms, invalid as
beyond the powers granted to Congress under the Commerce Clause.'
On December 21, in United States v. Edwards,4 the Ninth Circuit
reached the opposite conclusion, rejecting the Lopez reasoning5 and ex-
plicitly recognizing that an intercircuit conflict would be created.6 In
addition, there have been five recent district court rulings on motions to
dismiss indictments under the Act, based on its putative unconstitution-
ality, with varied results.7 On April 18, 1994, the Supreme Court de-
cided to review the Lopez decision.'
* I would like to thank Professor George C. Cochran of the University of Missis-
sippi Law Center for having challenged me, during the summer of 1993, to write the
mock dissent to Wickard v. Filburn that marked the beginning of my efforts in this area.
Additionally, I am grateful for the input of the following members of the Fordham Law
faculty: Martin S. Flaherty, Michael M. Martin, William M. Treanor, and, especially,
Sean P. Walsh. Finally, many thanks are due to all those who assisted me in the prepara-
tion of this Note for publication, including Christopher W. Atkinson, Gian Brown,
Kieran Doyle, William J. Geller, Cristopher Greer, Nina Keilin, Robert S. Mayer, John
M. Mawe, Kathy L. McFarland, Thomas A. McGrath, David F. Roth, Jonathan S. Sha-
piro, and Paul F. Washington.
1. Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 1702, 104 Stat.
4844-45 (1990) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (Supp. IV 1992)).
2. 2 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1993), cert granted, 62 U.S.L.W. 3690 (U.S. Apr. 18, 1994)
(No. 93-1260).
3. See id. at 1367-68. The court noted that "[n]o other basis for section 922(q) ha[d]
been suggested." Id. at 1368 n.52.
4. 13 F.3d 291 (9th Cir. 1993), petition for cert filed Mar. 25, 1994 (No. 93-8487).
5. See id. at 294. The Ninth Circuit observed: "With respect, we believe the Fifth
Circuit has misinterpreted, or refused to follow, the decisions of the United States
Supreme Court that are binding on all courts inferior to our nation's highest court." Id.
The Ninth Circuit is here referring to the Lopez court's treatment of Congress's failure to
have made formal or informal findings in enacting the Gun-Free School Zones Act. For
a detailed discussion of this aspect of the Lopez-Edwards split, see infra part III.
6. See Edwards, 13 F.3d at 294.
7. See United States v. Ornelas, 841 F. Supp. 1087 (D. Colo. 1994) (constitutional);
United States v. Glover, 842 F. Supp. 1327 (D. Kan. 1994) (constitutional); United States
v. Trigg, 842 F. Supp. 450 (D. Kan. 1994) (unconstitutional); United States v. Holland,
841 F. Supp. 143 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (constitutional); United States v. Morrow, 834 F. Supp.
364 (N.D. Ala. 1993) (unconstitutional).
8. 62 U.S.L.W. 3690 (U.S. Apr. 18, 1994) (No. 93-1260).
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It is generally agreed that the modem scope of the commerce power,
as a source of legislative authority for Congress, is quite broad, even vir-
tually unlimited. 9 Thus, not surprisingly, the Commerce Clause' ° has
become, in recent years, the foundation for an expanding federal criminal
jurisdiction over intrastate activities," on the theory that such activities
"affect interstate commerce."' 2 Although the Supreme Court has stated
that there are limits to the breadth of the commerce power, ' 3 the absence
of any clearly articulated doctrine defining these limits' 4 has left the reso-
lution of the Lopez-Edwards split an open question.' 5
9. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of
the Law 158 (1990) ("[T]he expansion of Congress's commerce, taxing, and spending
powers has reached a point where it is not possible to state that, as a matter of articulated
doctrine, there are any limits left."); Rogers M. Smith, Liberalism and American Consti-
tutional Law 162 (1990) ("The Court's affirmation of the Civil Rights Act [of 1964] con-
firmed the disappearance of any real limits on the commerce power.... ."). For a critical
analysis of the modem scope of the commerce power, see Richard A. Epstein, The Proper
Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 Va. L. Rev. 1387 (1987).
10. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
11. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 211 (1960) (recognizing "an era of
expanding federal criminal jurisdiction"); United States v. LeFaivre, 507 F.2d 1288, 1296
(4th Cir. 1974) (recognizing "the problem of expanding federal criminal jurisdiction");
United States v. Glover, 842 F. Supp. 1327, 1332 (D. Kan. 1994) ("Congress generally
relies upon the Commerce Clause to enact federal criminal laws."); Gerald Gunther,
Constitutional Law 137 (12th ed. 1991) (recognizing that "risks persist in the mounting
modem resort to the commerce power as the basis for new federal criminal laws"); Rob-
ert L. Stem, The Commerce Clause Revisited-The Federalization of Intrastate Crime, 15
Ariz. L. Rev. 271, 274 (1973) ("[R]ecent developments in the federalization of intrastate
crime which appear to extend the commerce power beyond previous limits raise impor-
tant constitutional questions under the commerce clause."); Tracy W. Resch, Comment,
The Scope of the Federal Criminal Jurisdiction Under the Commerce Clause, 1972 U. Ill.
L.F. 805, 805 (1972) ("The expansive reading given [the Commerce Clause] by the judici-
ary has allowed the federal government, in relatively recent times, to inject itself deep into
the field of crime control.").
12. Modem applications include federal prosecutions for arson involving apartment
buildings, see Russell v. United States, 471 U.S. 858, 862 (1985) (relying on the theory
that the rental of "apartment unit[s]" is an activity that affects commerce), as well as for
"loan sharking," see Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971). Under current Com-
merce Clause jurisprudence, Congress may regulate not only "activities affecting com-
merce" but also "the use of channels of interstate or foreign commerce" and the
"protection of the instrumentalities of interstate commerce." Id. at 150. See also Fry v.
United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 (1975) ("Even activity that is purely intrastate in charac-
ter may be regulated by Congress, where the activity, combined with like conduct by
others similarly situated, affects commerce among the States or with foreign nations.").
13. See, e.g., Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 198 (1968) ("This Court has examined
and will continue to examine federal statutes to determine whether there is a rational
basis for regarding them as regulations of commerce among the states.").
14. See, e.g., Bork, supra note 9, at 158 (describing the commerce power as without
articulated limits); cf. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S.
264, 307 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (describing the principle of a federal govern-
ment of limited powers as a "fiction" and the manner in which the Court has construed
the Commerce Clause as an illustration thereof); United States v. Cortner, 834 F. Supp.
242, 244 (M.D. Tenn. 1993) (stating that the courts have "stretched the Commerce
Clause ... beyond the wildest imagination of the Framers and beyond any rational inter-
pretation of the language itself").
15. This Note argues that the scope of the commerce power, even as it is currently
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This disagreement between the Fifth and Ninth Circuits represents a
major divergence of judicial opinion on the essential question of the
breadth of Congress's power. Accordingly, the outcome of the debate
will have far-reaching consequences, not only on the development of
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, but also, as a practical matter, on the
future of the growing trend toward federalizing intrastate crimes.' 6 The
Court now has the opportunity to delineate more precisely the contours
of the modem commerce power, and, in so doing, to shape the future
extension of the federal criminal jurisdiction into intrastate activities.'
Even more significantly, the Court, in reviewing Lopez, may take a conse-
quential step toward deciding whether federalism remains a viable con-
cept as we enter the twenty-first century.
This Note argues that Lopez must be affirmed, that the modern scope
of the commerce power, although undeniably broader than that contem-
plated by the Framers, is nonetheless still not expansive enough to justify
upholding the Act, and that arguments for allowing the continued expan-
sion of the commerce power are flawed. Part I of this Note discusses the
Gun-Free School Zones Act in the context of the Commerce Clause and
understood, is not broad enough to support federal intrusion into such purely intrastate
activities as simple firearms possession. As noted in Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1364 n.46, some
applications of the Gun-Free School Zones Act may raise Second Amendment concerns,
although these issues were not raised in that case and will not be explored in this Note.
For an argument that the Second Amendment should be taken seriously, see Sanford
Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 Yale L.J. 637 (1989). For a
thought-provoking proposal for solving the problem of handgun-related violence in
America, see James Q. Wilson, Just Take Away Their Guns, The New York Times Maga-
zine, Mar. 20, 1994, at 46.
16. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (discussing the expansion of the federal
criminal jurisdiction under the Commerce Clause).
17. It stands to reason that a greatly expanded federal criminal jurisdiction over in-
trastate activities would, at least to some extent, usurp the states' own penal laws. To the
extent that this were to occur, federal prosecutions for a broad array of intrastate crimes
would tend to circumvent criminal procedural protections based on the states' constitu-
tions, since the prosecutions for the federal crimes would be subject only to federal proce-
dural protections. Cf Robert F. Utter (Justice, Supreme Court of Washington),
Freedom and Diversity in a Federal System:" Perspectives on State Constitutions and the
Washington Declaration of Rights, 7 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 491, 499 (1984) ("Washing-
ton is one of many states that... have interpreted their state constitutions to provide
greater protection for individual rights than does the United States Constitution.") (foot-
notes omitted); compare California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988) (holding that the
Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the warrantless search or seizure of garbage left for
collection beyond the curtilage of a private dwelling) with State v. Hempele, 576 A.2d 793
(N.J. 1990) (holding that, under the New Jersey Constitution, such garbage may not be
subjected to a warrantless search); compare Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979)
(holding that the installation of a pen register on a private telephone line is not a "search"
under the Fourth Amendment) with State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808 (Wash. 1986) (en
bane) (holding that the Washington Constitution prohibits the warrantless installation of
pen registers). Perhaps the awareness that federal criminal prosecutions are not "bur-
dened" by state constitutional protections has contributed to popular support for meas-
ures such as the Gun-Free School Zones Act. Certainly, the support for such measures
must derive from a belief that federal criminal sanctions will be effective where state penal
laws have not.
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Tenth Amendment issues it raises. Part II traces the historical anteced-
ents to the present-day commerce power, with particular emphasis on
those decisions that have provided the foundation for the modem federal
criminal jurisdiction over intrastate activities. Part III digresses to focus
on the question of what weight should be accorded Congress's failure to
have made formal or informal findings of a nexus to interstate commerce,
an important point of divergence between the Lopez and Edwards opin-
ions." Part III concludes by suggesting that, where Congress wishes to
use the Commerce Clause as the basis for regulation of intrastate activity
that lacks a well established or obvious relationship to interstate com-
merce, congressional establishment of a nexus to commerce should be a
minimal prerequisite to a presumption of constitutionality. Part IV,
drawing from the historical perspective introduced in Part II, raises
broader issues not definitively addressed in the Lopez and Edwards opin-
ions, and argues for a halt to the expansion of the commerce power that
has occurred since the New Deal. This Note concludes by questioning
whether the current breadth of the commerce power was indeed contem-
plated by the New Deal decisions, and by reiterating the principles that
the expansion of the commerce power must be checked and that the leg-
islature should be encouraged to identify the constitutional source of
power for legislation that is not clearly based on any of Congress's enu-
merated powers.
I. THE GUN-FREE SCHOOL ZONES ACT, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE,
AND THE TENTH AMENDMENT
The Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(q),' 9 makes it "unlawful for any individual knowingly to possess a
firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to
believe, is a school zone."20 The Act provides for certain exceptions 2'
and includes a disclaimer to the effect that "[n]othing in this subsection
shall be construed as preempting or preventing a State or local govern-
ment from enacting a statute establishing gun-free school zones as pro-
18. Compare Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1363-65 (arguing that findings are necessary) with Ed-
wards, 13 F.3d at 293-95 (contra). As the Lopez court noted, "findings [ ] can be inferred
from committee reports, testimony before Congress, or statutory terms expressly provid-
ing for some nexus to interstate commerce." Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1362. Thus, while the term
"findings" often refers to formal legislative (i.e., explicit) findings, it may, in a broader
sense, refer to informal (i.e., implicit) findings such as a legislative history.
19. Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 1702, 104 Stat.
4844-45 (1990) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (Supp. IV 1992)).
20. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A). The term "school zone," for the purposes of the Act, is
defined as: "(A) in, or on the grounds of, a public, parochial or private school; or (B)
within a distance of 1,000 feet from the grounds of a public, parochial or private school."
"School," in turn, is defined as "a school which provides elementary or secondary educa-
tion under State law." See id. at § 921(a)(26).
21. See id. at § 922(q)(1)(B). As noted in Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1346, none of the excep-
tions were applicable in that case. The same is true of the other cases ruling on the Act's
constitutionality. See cases cited infra note 34.
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vided in this subsection."'  Violations are punishable by up to five years'
imprisonment and a fine not to exceed $5,000.3 Significantly, the Act
contains no formal findings of a nexus between interstate commerce and
the activity (gun possession on or near school grounds) sought to be
regulated.24
The bills that resulted in the enactment of § 922(q) were introduced in
the Senate by Senator Herbert Kohl of Wisconsin as S. 2070 and in the
House by Representative Edward Feighan of Ohio as H.R. 3757.26 The
Lopez2 7 opinion noted that the Senate bill has no known formal legisla-
tive history,28 but that a House Judiciary Subcommittee hearing was held
on H.R. 3757.29 According to the Fifth Circuit, "Witnesses told this
subcommittee of tragic instances of gun violence in our schools, but there
was no testimony concerning the effect of such violence upon interstate
commerce." 3 A court in the District of Colorado, however, has identi-
fied one statement from the subcommittee hearing that may reveal a con-
nection to interstate commerce: a police chief from Cleveland testified
that gang members from Los Angeles, Chicago, and Detroit were coming
into the Cleveland area to organize local gangs, possibly supplying them
with weapons. 31 Thus, the legislative history is not entirely devoid of
evidence that the Commerce Clause may have been considered by Con-
gress in its deliberations concerning the constitutionality of the proposed
enactment, but neither is it clear that such considerations were by any
means substantial.32 Nevertheless, the Commerce Clause, by default,
22. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(3).
23. See id at § 924(a)(4).
24. See Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1364. But formal findings have subsequently been proposed
as an amendment to the Gun-Free School Zones Act, perhaps in response to the Lopez
decision. See infra part III.B. It is also important to note at the outset that § 922(q)
contains no commerce "element," i.e., statutory language linking the crime of gun posses-
sion in schools to interstate commerce. See Edwards, 13 F.3d at 292-93 ("The Gun-Free
School Zones Act... does not expressly require the Government to establish a nexus
between the possession of a firearm in a school zone and interstate commerce."); cf infra
note 36 and accompanying text (defining the term "element").
25. See 136 Cong. Rec. S766-67 (1990) ("To ensure that our school grounds do not
become battlegrounds, I am introducing the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990.")
(statement of Sen. Kohl).
26. See 136 Cong. Rec. E3988 (1989) ("I am today introducing legislation to create
gun-free school Zones.") (statement of Rep. Feighan).
27. United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 62 U.S.L.W.
3690 (U.S. Apr. 18, 1994) (No. 93-1260).
28. See id at 1359.
29. See id at 1359-60 (citing Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990: Hearings on H.R.
3757 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess. (1990) [hereinafter Hearings]).
30. See Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1359.
31. See United States v. Ornelas, 841 F. Supp. 1087, 1092 (1994) (citing Hearings,
supra note 29 (statement of Edward Kovacic)).
32. Congress's apparent lack of debate concerning the constitutional basis for the
Gun-Free School Zones Act is in sharp contrast to the exhaustive debates that preceded
the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See infra part II.C.
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seems the only possible basis for the Act,"3 and, indeed, has been the
constitutional basis cited by the government in all cases heard so far in
which the Act's constitutionality has been challenged.34
The Lopez opinion also noted that officials from the Treasury Depart-
ment's Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms testified that "the
source of constitutional authority to enact the legislation is not manifest
on the face of the bill." 5 The BATF officials further noted that "when
Congress first enacted the prohibitions against possession of firearms by
felons ... and others, the legislation contained specific findings relating
to the Commerce Clause and other constitutional bases, and the unlawful
acts specifically included a commerce element. '36
This testimony was not specifically discussed in the Ninth Circuit's
opinion in United States v. Edwards,"7 with the court instead taking the
position that the hearings and formal findings accompanying earlier leg-
islation obviated the need for further findings relating the area of gun
control to interstate commerce.3" While this argument seems at first
blush to be a reasonable one (indeed, it would seem ridiculous, by con-
trast, to require that Congress rediscover a commerce nexus with each
new enactment in a given, well established area of legislation), it is open
to some criticism on the basis that the Gun-Free School Zones Act is
qualitatively different from most, if not all, federal firearms legislation
that has preceded it. Earlier legislation focused on the interstate trans-
port of, or commercial transactions involving, firearms, whereas the
Gun-Free School Zones Act criminalizes simple intrastate possession.39
33. See supra note 3 and accompanying text; see also infra note 63 (discussing argu-
ments that the Necessary and Proper Clause could be interpreted as an independent grant
of legislative power).
34. See United States v. Edwards, 13 F.3d 291, 292 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v.
Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1346 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Ornelas, 841 F. Supp, 1087,
1089 (D. Colo. 1994); United States v. Glover, 842 F. Supp. 1327, 1328 (D. Kan. 1994);
United States v. Trigg, 842 F. Supp. 450, 450 (D. Kan. 1994); United States v. Holland,
841 F. Supp. 143, 144 (E.D. Pa. 1993); United States v. Morrow, 834 F. Supp. 364, 365
(N.D. Ala. 1993).
35. Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1359-60 (citing Hearings, supra note 29 (statements of Richard
Cook and Bradley Buckles)).
36. Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1360 (citing Hearings, supra note 29 (statements of Richard
Cook and Bradley Buckles)). An "element," as the term is used in this context, is a
phrase in the statute, such as "in commerce" or "affecting commerce," that establishes a
nexus between the activity regulated and interstate commerce. When a commerce ele-
ment is present in a statute, it must be alleged and proved by the government in order to
obtain a conviction. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 339 (1971); cf supra note 24
(discussing the lack of a commerce element in the Gun-Free School Zones Act).
37. 13 F.3d 291 (9th Cir. 1993), petition for cert. filed Mar. 25, 1994 (No. 93-8487).
38. See id. at 295 ("Where, as here, however, Congress in adopting earlier legislation
has found that the activity sought to be regulated affects interstate commerce, additional
hearings and findings on this question are unnecessary.").
39. See Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1348-59 (providing a history of federal firearms laws). That
the Gun-Free School Zones Act differs significantly from prior federal firearms legislation
was precisely the position taken by the Lopez court. See id. at 1364. For a discussion of
this position, and of the related question of whether Congress need establish a nexus to
interstate commerce, see infra part III.
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As a final consideration concerning the enactment of the Gun-Free
School Zones Act, it is noteworthy that President Bush, on signing the
Crime Control Act of 1990, commented that the Gun-Free School Zones
Act "inappropriately overrides legitimate State firearms laws with a new
and unnecessary Federal law. The policies reflected in these provisions
could legitimately be adopted by the States, but they should not be im-
posed on the States by the Congress."'  Although this presidential com-
mentary has no binding authority in a judicial assessment of the Act's
constitutionality, it is nonetheless worthy of attention in light of the no-
tion that each of the three branches of the federal government has a duty
to examine the constitutionality of legislation.4
The substance of the President's comment reflects a concern that Con-
gress, by imposing a federal remedy that may conflict with the states'
statutory schemes, is upsetting the balance of power envisaged by our
federal system.42 If the Act is indeed an exercise of legislative power
beyond that delegated to Congress, it may also be described as a violation
of the Tenth Amendment,43 for it is widely recognized that both issues
are interrelated:
In a case... involving the division of authority between federal and
state governments, the two inquiries are mirror images of each other.
If a power is delegated to Congress in the Constitution, the Tenth
Amendment expressly disclaims any reservation of that power to the
States; if a power is an attribute of state sovereignty reserved by the
40. Statement by President George Bush upon signing S. 3266, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6696-1 (Dec. 3, 1990).
41. See, e.g., Gunther, supra note 11, at 21-22 (raising the question of the exclusivity
of the judiciary's role in evaluating the constitutionality of statutes); John W. Brewer &
Leonard A. Leo, Foreword to Who Speaks for the Constitution? The Debate Over Inter-
pretive Authority (The Federalist Society, Occasional Paper No. 3), at v-xii (1992) [here-
inafter Federalist Society] (discussing the role of the President in constitutional
interpretation); see also Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations 68-69 (discussing
early veto messages that interpreted the Constitution and looked "rather similar to judi-
cial opinions"); cf United States v. LeFaivre, 507 F.2d 1288, 1296 (4th Cir. 1974) ("We
think the solution to the problem of expanding federal criminal jurisdiction is not for the
courts to deny that the jurisdiction exists and that Congress may implement it but instead
for the executive branch to exercise wisely the discretion vested in it by the Congress.")
(footnote omitted).
42. It has been proposed that the original meaning of federalism-that the national
government would be one of limited and enumerated powers-has been largely (and legit-
imately) replaced by a recognition that the federal government "would operate as a truly
national government, speaking for the People on all matters that sufficiently attracted the
interest of lawmakers in Washington, D.C." See Ackerman, supra note 41, at 105. Pro-
fessor Ackerman proposes that the New Deal was a period of "constitutional politics"
during which the popular will gave "constitutional legitimacy to a new vision of activist
national government that did not have deep popular roots in our previous constitutional
experience." See iL at 104. But see infra text accompanying notes 251-53 (distinguishing
popular support for a federal government of expanded economic powers from that for
one of expanded police powers).
43. U.S. Const. amend. X. The text reads: "The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people." It
1994] 1801
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Tenth Amendment, it is necessarily a power the Constitution has not
conferred on Congress. 44
Similarly, the Lopez court recognized that, "[iln actuality, the Tenth
Amendment and Commerce Clause issues in this case are but two sides
of the same coin."45 Whichever metaphor one chooses, it is important to
recognize that the two issues are interrelated because the Tenth Amend-
ment, as an articulation of the principle of a federal government of lim-
ited, enumerated powers, is dependent on the assumption that the
Commerce Clause is not (or will not become) a grant of unlimited
power.4 6 Indeed, if the commerce power is truly without limits, then
there are no "powers not delegated to the United States [that must be]
reserved to the States[,]" 47 and the Tenth Amendment is without mean-
ing. Chief Justice (then Justice) Rehnquist recognized in 1981 that the
expansion of the commerce power represents a threat to these principles
of federalism:
It is illuminating for purposes of reflection, if not for argument, to
note that one of the greatest "fictions" of our federal system is that the
Congress exercises only those powers delegated to it, while the remain-
der are reserved to the States or to the people. The manner in which
this Court has construed the Commerce Clause amply illustrates the
extent of this fiction.4"
If the commerce power has expanded, it follows that the powers re-
served to the states have contracted. Therefore, although much of the
ensuing historical discussion focuses on what may be interpreted as an
expansion of the commerce power, the same phenomenon may be as
readily conceptualized as the progressive erosion of the Tenth Amend-
ment, and of the principles of federalism expressed by its inclusion in the
Bill of Rights.
II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF COMMERCE CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
The modern scope of the commerce power, it has been said, is one that
"grants the federal government jurisdiction so long as it can show (as it
always can) that the regulated activity burdens, obstructs, or affects in-
terstate commerce, however indirectly."49 If this statement is accurate, it
would seem that the Commerce Clause has effectively become (or is
44. New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2417 (1992).
45. Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1346.
46. See id. at 1347; cf John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial
Review 36 (1980) (stating, in the context of a discussion about the Ninth Amendment,
that the Tenth Amendment "clearly expresses" an intention "to forestall ... the implica-
tion of unexpressed powers").
47. U.S. Const. amend. X.
48. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 307 (1981)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring).
49. Epstein, supra note 9, at 1387.
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about to become, should Lopez50 be reversed) a grant to Congress of leg-
islative power over any subject,51 which would arguably render the Tenth
Amendment, and the principle of a federal government of limited, enu-
merated powers, void. 2 An alternative view holds that the commerce
power has not expanded but instead has been understood to be a compre-
hensive grant of federal power since the earliest days of the Republic.
A. Gibbons v. Ogden: Basis for the Modern Commerce Power?
The well-known 1824 case of Gibbons v. Ogden 3 held that a 1793 fed-
eral statute licensing ships in coastwise trade preempted a New York
statute that would have granted a monopoly on interstate (New York-
New Jersey) steamboat trade.' Gibbons was the opinion by Chief Justice
Marshall that, at least according to some scholars and judges, gave the
commerce power the broad scope that it enjoys today." Even in Lopez,
itself an opinion that would limit the scope of the commerce power, the
court reiterates the notion that the modem breadth of the Commerce
Clause had its roots in Gibbons:
We are, of course, fully cognizant and respectful of the great scope
of the commerce power. It is generally agreed that in a series of deci-
sions culminating in Wickard v. Filburn ... the Supreme Court fixed
the modem definition of the commerce power, returning it to the
breadth of Gibbons v. Ogden ....
But the idea that the modem cases have "returned" the breadth of the
commerce power to that which existed immediately after Gibbons is far
50. United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 62 U.S.L.W.
3690 (U.S. Apr. 18, 1994) (No. 93-1260).
51. The power of Congress would, of course, be limited by other constraints (e.g.,
those expressed in the Bill of Rights). See, e.g., Ely, supra note 46, at 36. But the princi-
ple that the federal government is one of limited, delegated powers would be negated by
the Commerce Clause's becoming a grant of authority to Congress to legislate in any area
it chooses. In deciding Lopez, the Court now has an opportunity to choose between a
federal government of limited powers (albeit greatly expanded since the Founding) and
one apparently without affirmative limits. Cf Epstein, supra note 9, at 1397 (noting that
an expansive interpretation of the Commerce Clause has done away with the protections
afforded by the design of a federal government of limited powers, and that the "necessary
effect is that greater burdens are placed upon substantive limitations, such as the Bill of
Rights").
52. See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
53. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
54. See id at 1-2, 190-91, 213-17. For a criticism of Chief Justice Marshall's proposi-
tion that the federal law was of sufficient scope to preempt the state enactment, see Bork,
supra note 9, at 27.
55. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942) ("At the beginning Chief
Justice Marshall described the federal commerce power with a breadth never yet ex-
ceeded."); see also infra note 84 (citing other sources that develop this viewpoint). But
see Gunther, supra note 11, at 97 (questioning this broad interpretation of Gibbons); Ep-
stein, supra note 9, at 1401-08 (arguing that the scope of the commerce power under
Gibbons is considerably narrower than has been suggested subsequently).
56. Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1360 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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from universally accepted.57 As Professor Richard Epstein points out,
the case merely decided that navigation between the states is interstate
commerce 58 and that regulation of navigation (and, therefore, of inter-
state commerce) must be able to take place not only as a ship crosses
from the waters of one state into those of another, but also at any and all
points along the interstate voyage. 59 In rebutting the argument that in-
terstate commerce (and, hence, its regulation) can only occur at the infin-
itesimally narrow border between states, Chief Justice Marshall wrote:
Commerce among the States[ ] cannot stop at the external boundary
line of each State, but may be introduced into the interior.
It is not intended to say that these words comprehend that com-
merce, which is completely internal, which is carried on between man
and man in a State, or between different parts of the same State, and
which does not extend to or affect other States. Such a power would be
inconvenient, and is certainly unnecessary.
Comprehensive as the word "among" is, it may very properly be
restricted to that commerce which concerns more States than one.
The phrase is not one which would probably have been selected to
indicate the completely interior traffic of a State, because it is not an
apt phrase for that purpose; and the enumeration of the particular
classes of commerce to which the power was to be extended, would not
have been made, had the intention been to extend the power to every
description.6°
In thus describing the limitations on the commerce power, this passage
would seem to weaken the position that the more recent cases "returned"
57. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 9, at 1399-1400 ("The New Deal was not a reforma-
tion, but a sharp departure from previous case law, and one that moved federal power far
beyond anything Chief Justice Marshall had in mind."); Smith, supra note 9, at 154 ("It
was long conventional for constitutional scholars to disregard the question of the substan-
tive novelty of New Deal thought and to declare that its constitutional theory was simply
a reversion to Marshall's broad view of national powers, and especially [of] the commerce
clause.... However, the New Deal's constitutional ideas were fundamental, if moderate,
innovations within liberalism.") (footnote omitted); cf Paul L. Murphy, The Constitu-
tion in Crisis Times, 1918-1969, at 168 (1972) (describing the insistence of "New Deal
leaders both on and off the bench" that they were "returning the nation to the bedrock
principles of the Founding Fathers" and stating that "Marshall had given great breadth
to the commerce clause for totally different reasons than had the New Dealers").
58. See Epstein, supra note 9, at 1401 (explaining Gibbons); see also Gibbons, 22 U.S.(9 Wheat.) at 190 ("If commerce does not include navigation, the government of the
Union has no direct power over that subject . . . . All America understands, and has
uniformly understood, the word 'commerce,' to comprehend navigation.").
59. See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 194 ("Commerce among the States, cannot
stop at the external boundary line of each State, but may be introduced into the inte-
rior."); see also Epstein, supra note 9 at 1403 (explaining Gibbons).
60. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 194-95 (emphasis added). The analysis of the
word "among" refers to that word as used in the Commerce Clause ("To regulate Com-
merce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes;").
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (emphasis added). The reference to "the enumeration of the
particular classes of commerce," Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 194, refers to the three
classes mentioned in the constitutional text: foreign, interstate, and that with "the Indian
Tribes." See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, el. 3.
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the breadth of the commerce power to that which existed in 1824. To
say that "[a]t the beginning Chief Justice Marshall described the federal
commerce power with a breadth never yet exceeded"'" not only ignores
the clear import of the language quoted above, but also rather disingenu-
ously filters the Gibbons opinion from its historical setting. Indeed, it is
unlikely that Chief Justice Marshall, when using relatively sweeping lan-
guage to describe the commerce power,6' would have contemplated its
becoming the basis for a federal "police power" over intrastate
activities.63
Given the broad expansion of the commerce power that has, at least
according to one interpretation of history, occurred between then and
now, 64 one might argue that the scope of the commerce power immedi-
ately after Gibbons is of no importance. More recent precedent, after all,
61. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942) (citing Gibbons). Professor Ep-
stein's succinct response to this characterization of Gibbons is, "No way." Epstein, supra
note 9, at 1408.
62. See, eg., Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 196 ("This power, like all others vested in
congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no
limitations other than are prescribed in the constitution.").
63. The commerce power was "still not used heavily" as a basis for federal legislation
during the fifty years following Gibbons. See Smith, supra note 9, at 149. That the first
case ever to strike down legislation as beyond Congress's power under the Commerce
Clause did not occur until 1869, see id at 151, is probably itself ample evidence that the
legislative milieu in which Gibbons was written was such that invasive federal regulation
was not yet even contemplated. The 1869 case struck down a statute making it a misde-
meanor to sell substandard lamp oil (for safety reasons), which early attempt to create a
federal "police power" was summarily thwarted. See United States v. Dewitt, 76 U.S. (9
Wall.) 41 (1869). Thus, it is unlikely that Chief Justice Marshall, in writing Gibbons, was
considering the possibility of the extension of the commerce power into the realm of a
federal police power over intrastate matters. Indeed, the language of Dewitt is decidedly
at odds with any interpretation of the post-Gibbons view of the commerce power as akin
to the modem one:
That Congress has the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and
among the several States, and with the Indian tribes, the Constitution expressly
declares. But this express grant of power to regulate commerce among the
States has always been understood as limited by its terms;, and as a virtual denial
of any power to interfere with the internal trade and business of the separate
States; except, indeed, as a necessary and proper means for carrying into execu-
tion some other power expressly granted or vested....
As a police regulation, relating exclusively to the internal trade of the State,
[the statute] can only have effect where the legislative authority of Congress
excludes, territorially, all State legislation, as for example, in the District of
Columbia. Within State limits, it can have no constitutional operation. This
has been so frequently declared by this court, results so obviouslyfrom the terms
of the Constitution, and has been so fully explained and supported on former
occasions, that we think it unnecessary to enter again upon the discussion.
Dewitt, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) at 43-45 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). The reference to
the Necessary and Proper Clause also clearly indicates that this clause could not be used
to magnify the Commerce Clause into a limitless grant of power, as some have suggested,
but only to carry into execution some other power expressly granted or vested. Cf Ep-
stein, supra note 9, at 1397-99 (arguing that the Necessary and Proper Clause does not
"provide for an unlimited grant of federal power").
64. But see supra note 55 and accompanying text (presenting the alternative view-
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has intervened, so that no matter what the "original understanding" (as
would have been reflected in Gibbons by virtue of its temporal proximity
to the ratification of the Constitution), the Commerce Clause now is un-
derstood to confer upon Congress broad regulatory powers in diverse
subject areas. Yet this argument that precedent overrides text ignores
the principle that "the ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is the
Constitution itself and not what we have said about it.''65 And while it
may be true that the precedent that has evolved over the past fifty years
has created enormous reliance interests in a modern federal government
that cannot readily be dismantled,66 it is nonetheless not inevitable that
the trend to expand the commerce power must continue into new subject
areas. 67 Arguably, the Gun-Free School Zones Act represents a new in-
cursion into previously untrodden areas of federal criminal legislation,68
but before turning to that issue it would be worthwhile to examine the
period of greatest expansion of the commerce power, which undoubtedly
set the stage for the Malthusian growth of Title 18 that has since
occurred.
B. The New Deal and the "Death of Federalism"'9
By the time President Franklin Delano Roosevelt took office in 1933,
the Court had two lines of Commerce Clause precedent upon which to
draw.70 On the one hand, federal regulation of monopoly in manufac-
ture,7" and of the interstate movement of the products of child labor,72
point that the New Deal decisions returned the commerce power to the breadth contem-
plated during the days of John Marshall).
65. Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 491-92 (1939) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring); cf Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Washington Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 265
(1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (describing established prece-
dent that conflicts with the Constitution as "a sort of intellectual adverse possession").
66. See Epstein, supra note 9, at 1455.
67. See, e.g., Bork, supra note 9, at 158 ("[Ihe expansion of Congress's commerce,
taxing, and spending powers has reached a point where it is not possible to state that, as a
matter of articulated doctrine, there are any limits left. That does not mean, however, that
the Court must necessarily repeat its mistake as congressional legislation attempts to reach
new subject areas.") (emphasis added); cf Resch, supra note 11, at 823 ("In an earlier
series of decisions, the Court virtually eliminated the commerce clause as an obstacle to
the extension of federal power in respect to economic regulation. It may be that the same
course of events is not likely to be repeated in the criminal area.").
68. See Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1366.
69. The reference to the "death of federalism" is borrowed from the following
passage:
It was shortly after [Chief Justice Charles Evans] Hughes's retirement that
Wickard v. Filburn permitted Congress to limit the wheat a farmer grew for his
own consumption on the ground that what he could not grow he might buy
from another state. But that was only to write the epitaph; constitutional
federalism had died in 1937.
David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Second Century, 1888-
1986, at 238 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
70. See Smith, supra note 9, at 153.
71. See United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895). In this "Sugar Trust
Case," the Court affirmed the dismissal of a government civil action to set aside, under
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had been held to be beyond the commerce power. On the other hand, the
Court had upheld federal legislation prohibiting the interstate transport
of "contraband" such as lottery tickets,73 impure foods,74 and stolen
automobiles.7' Notably, these early uses of the "federal police power" (a
phrase that would have been alien, no doubt, in John Marshall's day)76
required that the prohibited goods first move in interstate commerce.'
Squaring the "Child Labor Case"7  with the "Lottery Case"' 9 was not
easily accomplished (since both statutes would take effect only upon the
interstate movement of the prohibited products), but Justice Day's opin-
ion in the former distinguished the line of cases exemplified by the latter
on the ground that the "evil" of child labor was confined to the original
locality and had ended by the time the items entered interstate
commerce.
80
Into this delicate apportionment of the states' versus the federal gov-
ernment's legislative powers8' came the wave of legislation known as the
the Sherman Antitrust Act, the acquisition by the American Sugar Refining Company of
the stock of four other sugar refineries, creating a monopoly. The Court held that such a
"monopoly in manufacture" could not be "directly suppressed" and distinguished "man-
ufacture" from "commerce." See id at 11-18.
72. See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) ("The Child Labor Case").
73. See Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903) ("The Lottery Case").
74. See Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45 (1911).
75. See Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432 (1925).
76. See supra note 63 (supporting the premise that a federal "police power" was not
yet contemplated at the time of Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824)).
77. See Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 326-27 (1908); Hipolite Egg, 220 U.S. at 51;
Brooks, 267 U.S. at 439-40.
78. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
79. Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
80. See Hammer, 247 U.S. at 270-72.
81. Some of the results derived from the distinction between the "Child Labor Case"
and the line of cases that upheld legislation prohibiting interstate movement of a continu-
ing "evil" were criticized severely. For example, in an essay accompanying a letter to
President Roosevelt, written in 1939 during the controversy over the court-packing plan
and not long before his appointment to the Supreme Court, Felix Frankfurter
commented:
The Congress has very properly been allowed to use the Commerce Clause to
protect the children of the rich from kidnappers, but the Congress has been
denied the right to use the same power to protect the children of the poor from
the terrible exploitation of child labor.
These decisions, and many more that I could cite, cannot be justified by any-
thing in the Constitution. They are explained by the fact that some of the Jus-
tices have identified the Constitution with their private social philosophy.
Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Franklin Delano Roosevelt (1939), in Roosevelt and
Frankfurter: Their Correspondence, 1928-1945, at 383 (Freedman ed., 1967), reprinted
in Federalist Society, supra note 41, at 79, 83. The extent and rapidity of the change that
occurred shortly thereafter is amply illustrated by the comments of Senator Robert Taft
in a speech delivered at Kenyon College seven years later:
Government action which twenty-five years ago would have excited a sense of
outrage in thousands is... disapproved with a shrug of the shoulders and a
hopeless feeling that nothing can be done about it.
To a large extent this feeling has been promoted by the attack on the Supreme
Court, and the effort to make the courts instruments of executive policy. The
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New Deal. The Court's initial resistance to much New Deal legislation,
followed by the President's unsuccessful "court-packing" plan, and, ulti-
mately, by the death or retirement of seven of the nine justices by 194 L,2
is too familiar a story to be retold here, except to note the occurrence of
these events as historical background to the decisions that emerged.8 3
Although the prevailing rhetoric was that the cases of this era "returned"
the breadth of the commerce power to that of John Marshall's day,84 it
has come to be recognized, at least by some, that the New Deal decisions,
and not those they overturned, represented the true departure from the
Gibbons view.85 Three principal and pivotal decisions marked this transi-
tion: National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. ,6
United States v. Darby,87 and Wickard v. Filburn.as
In 1937, in Jones & Laughlin Steel, the Court upheld the constitution-
ality of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 and abandoned the
distinction between "manufacturing" and "commerce" that had been ar-
ticulated in United States v. E. C. Knight.89 The Court in Jones & Laugh-
lin Steel instead focused on the effects on commerce of the respondent
corporation's operations and of potentially "commerce-threatening" la-
old Court may have been too conservative, but the judges believed they were
interpreting the laws and Constitution as they were written, and most of the
country believed that they were honestly impartial. Today the Court regards
itself as the maker of policy-no maker of policy can command respect for
impartial dispensation of justice.
Senator Robert A. Taft, Address at Kenyon College (October 5, 1946), in Lend Me Your
Ears: Great Speeches in History 597, 600 (William Safire ed., 1992).
82. By 1941, President Roosevelt had appointed: Black (1937), replacing Van Devan-
ter (retired); Reed (1938), replacing Sutherland (retired); Frankfurter (1939), replacing
Cardozo (died); Douglas (1939), replacing Brandeis (retired); Murphy (1940), replacing
Butler (died); Byrnes (1941), replacing McReynolds (retired); and Jackson (1941), filling
the vacancy created by the promotion of Harlan Fiske Stone to Chief Justice following
the retirement of Charles Evans Hughes. See Gunther, supra note 11, app. B at B-5.
83. For a discussion of this period in American history, in the context of the constitu-
tional changes then taking place, see Currie, supra note 69, at 208-44; Murphy, supra
note 57, at 128-69. For a treatment of the same era that focuses on popular perceptions
of constitutional issues, see Michael Kammen, A Machine That Would Go of Itself: The
Constitution in American Culture 269-81 (1986).
84. See supra notes 55-63 and accompanying text. The notion that the Court had
strayed from the original "broad construction" of the Commerce Clause (and, therefore,
of the federal government's powers) was extensively developed by Edward Corwin of
Princeton University. See Edward S. Corwin, The Commerce Power versus States
Rights: Back to the Constitution (1936); see also Kammen, supra note 83, at 275 (dis-
cussing the book in its historical context). But Professor Corwin would later question
whether the pendulum had swung too far in favor of a powerful central government. See
Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 Va. L. Rev. 1 (1950); Kammen, supra note
83, at 317 (discussing same).
85. See supra part II.A.
86. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
87. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
88. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
89. Compare Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 34, 39 (abandoning the distinction
between manufacture and commerce) with E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. at 12-13 (articulating
that distinction); see also supra note 71 and accompanying text (discussing same).
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bor disputes that could occur if federal labor regulation were not permit-
ted.' ° Despite creating the basis for an "affecting commerce" rationale 9'
that would soon develop a life of its own,92 Jones & Laughlin Steel ex-
plicitly limited its approval of congressional intrusion into intrastate
matters:
Undoubtedly the scope of this power must be considered in light of our
dual system of government and may not be extended so as to embrace
effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and remote that to em-
brace them, in view of our complex society, would effectually obliterate
the distinction between what is national and what is local and create a
completely centralized government.93
The next principal case, United States v. Darby,94 expressly overruled
Hammer v. Dagenhart,9s the "Child Labor Case," in upholding the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938.96 Darby noted that the distinction on
which Hammer had rested 7 -that the "[c]ongressional power to pro-
hibit interstate commerce is limited to articles which in themselves have
some harmful or deleterious property"g-had "long since been aban-
doned[,]"9 9 and proceeded to overrule Hammer.l Darby thus success-
fully applied federal wage and hour regulations to intrastate labor where
the products of that labor were bound for interstate commerce, on the
combined bases that the payment of low wages adversely affected com-
merce0 1 and, more significantly, that, because Congress could prohibit
90. See Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 41-43.
9 1. See id at 43.
92. See infra part II.C-D.
93. 301 U.S. at 37 (citations omitted). One wonders, accordingly, whether the effect
of firearms possession on school grounds upon interstate commerce is "indirect" enough
to qualify under this caveat, and whether the federal criminalization of such intrastate
possession does indeed begin to obliterate the distinction between what is national and
what is local.
94. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
95. 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
96. See Darby, 312 U.S. at 108, 116 (overruling Hammer); id. at 125 (upholding stat-
ute). Again, the Court recognized, as it had in Jones & Laughlin Steel, that, while manu-
facturing is not commerce, there were means by which Congress might regulate
manufacturing because of its relationship to commerce. See Darby, 312 U.S. at 113.
97. See supra note 81 and text accompanying notes 78-80 (discussing Justice Day's
distinction between Hammer and the line of cases that upheld prohibition of the inter-
state transport of items such as lottery tickets, stolen cars, and impure foods).
98. Darby, 312 U.S. at 116.
99. Id
100. See id Hammer, however, had struck down a statute that would have regulated
only the interstate transport of the products of child labor, and not the intrastate work
conditions themselves. See supra text accompanying notes 72-80.
101. See Darby, 312 U.S. at 119-20. The Court's sole support for this premise was
Jones & Laughlin Steel, decided only four years before, and cases that followed it. See
Darby, 312 U.S at 119 (citing Jones & Laughlin Steel and its companion case, National
Labor Relations Board v. Fainblatt, 301 U.S. 601 (1937)). The Court, in a footnote, did
attempt to show more time-honored support for the power of Congress to regulate "activ-
ities intrastate which have a substantial effect on... commerce," but all the cases cited
were those in which the regulations upheld had been directed at instrumentalities of com-
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the interstate shipment of goods manufactured under "substandard" con-
ditions of employment, the legislature could therefore "choose the means
reasonably adapted to the attainment of the permitted end, even though
they involve control of intrastate activities."' 10 2 In other words, under
Darby, Congress could regulate intrastate work conditions as a means of
enforcing its "permitted end" of prohibiting the interstate transport of
the products of such work conditions.103
Like Darby, the 1942 case of Wickard v. Filburn"'4 was a unanimous
decision. 105 If Darby broke new ground by declaring that Congress could
reach intrastate activities as a means of enforcing its prohibition of the
interstate transport of the products of those activities, Wickard plowed
an entire new fieldl0 6 when it held that wheat grown for home consump-
tion was constitutionally within the reach of Congress to regulate. 10 7
The Wickard Court found that "[h]ome-grown wheat.., competes with
wheat in commerce"'0 8 by allowing a farmer to "forestall resort to the
market by producing to meet his own needs. ' '1°" At issue in the case was
the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, as amended, which established
quotas limiting the acreage of wheat for each farm, and which acreage
allotment for his own farm the appellee had exceeded by some 11.9
acres. "o The Court decided that, although the "appellee's own contribu-
tion to the demand for wheat may be trivial by itself[, it] is not enough to
remove him from the scope of federal regulation where, as here, his con-
tribution, taken together with that of many others similarly situated, is
far from trivial."'' Of course, the contribution to the nationwide de-
merce (e.g., railroads). See Darby, 312 U.S. at 119-20 & n.3. The "affecting commerce"
rationale was, after all, a brand new discovery.
102. Darby, 312 U.S. at 121.
103. See id. This approach has been criticized as "superbootstrapping," whereby Con-
gress could, if it desired, reach virtually any intrastate activity by prohibiting the inter-
state transport of the product of that activity and then prohibiting the intrastate activity
itself as a "means reasonably adapted" to the legislative goal. See Gunther, supra note
11, at 135-36; see also Currie, supra note 69, at 238 n. 177 (discussing the "superbootstrap-
ping" criticism).
104. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
105. Professor Currie succinctly summed up the explanation for the unanimous deci-
sions in Wickard and Darby: "There was no one left to dissent." Currie, supra note 69,
at 238 n.178; cf supra note 82 and accompanying text (listing President Roosevelt's ap-
pointments to the Supreme Court).
106. It is submitted that the Wickard rationale, at least as it has been interpreted, see
infra notes 111-12 and accompanying text, was more significant because, unlike Darby's
"superbootstrapping" approach, see supra note 103, the modified "affecting commerce"
rationale of Wickard has enjoyed wide use as a means for permitting congressional reach
into intrastate activities not directly connected to interstate commerce. Cf Stem, supra
note 11, at 275 n.29 ("Many have regarded Wickard as perhaps the most extreme appli-
cation of the commerce clause to intrastate transactions.").
107. See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128-29.
108. Id. at 128.
109. Id. at 127.
110. See id. at 114.
111. Id. at 127-28. For a brief but thought-provoking commentary on the scope of the
Wickard rationale, see Gunther, supra note 11, at 131.
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mand for wheat of any given defendant growing the crop for home con-
sumption would be quite minimal. Therefore, according to one
interpretation of the Wickard rationale, even legislation enacted primar-
ily to prohibit such "trivial" intrastate activity is sustainable under the
Commerce Clause, provided the aggregate effect on interstate commerce
is substantial.112
The statute at issue in Wickard was genuinely aimed at achieving eco-
nomic, commerce-related benefits (i.e., the stabilization of wheat prices).
Yet the Wickard rationale (or one interpretation of it) has had far-reach-
ing consequences in the area of federal criminal legislation, where the
aims may fairly be said to be social rather than economic. Nevertheless,
the principle that the federal government could regulate intrastate activi-
ties that "affect commerce" when the object of the proposed legislation
was other than economic was not conclusively established by Wickard
itself. That development would await two cases that were decided in the
1960s.
C. The Civil Rights Act Cases
Among the most significant enactments to be upheld under the Com-
merce Clause in recent times was Title II of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,11 which provides for injunctive relief against discrimination (on
the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin) in places of public
accommodation." 4 Particularly noteworthy is that the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 became the subject of unusually extensive congressional delibera-
tion on the possible sources of constitutional authority for the enact-
ment. 1 These 1963 debates focused on two issues: (1) whether the
source of legislative power for the proposed enactments should be the
commerce power or the post-Civil War amendments, and (2) whether the
112. Such a broad reading of Wickard, however, may be unwarranted. The Court has
explained the nature of the Wickard holding in Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968),
in a footnote written in response to the dissent in that case:
Neither here nor in Wickard has the Court declared that Congress may use a
relatively trivial impact on commerce as an excuse for broad general regulation
of state or private activities. The Court has said only that where a general regu-
latory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimis charac-
ter of individual instances arising under the statute is of no consequence.
Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 197 n.27. Under this reading, Wickard's holding does not support a
finding of constitutionality for the Gun-Free School Zones Act, for that enactment is
directly aimed at the "individual instances" and not, as with Wickard's Agricultural Ad-
justment Act, at broad regulation of activities substantially affecting commerce. Unlike
the farmer who grows some of his wheat crop for home consumption in violation of a
statute directed at commercial farming, the high school student in possession of a firearm
on school grounds is engaging in the very activity that the statute was enacted to prohibit.
For further discussion of this reading of Wickard and its implications, see infra part IV.
113. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 243-46 (1964) (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000b (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
114. See id,
115. See generally Gunther, supra note 11, at 145-51 (discussing congressional deliber-
ations prior to the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
1994] 1811
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
"affecting commerce" rationale that had its inception in Jones & Laugh-
lin Steel and had been developed in Darby and Wickard would provide
adequate support for the proposed enactments." 6 In the end, the Four-
teenth Amendment's inability to reach private action was perceived as a
disadvantage,' 1 7 and it was decided to rely on the Commerce Clause as
the source of legislative power.' 1 8
The rationale behind grounding the enactments in the commerce
power included that discrimination in hotels and restaurants burdens
travelers, thereby inhibiting interstate commerce; that such discrimina-
tion artificially restricts the market available for interstate goods and
services, thereby adversely affecting commerce; and that discrimination
inhibits the holding of conventions and meetings in segregated cities,
thereby reducing the flow of interstate commerce.119 Thus, even if the
effect of discrimination on commerce was not Congress's primary con-
cern, there was ample support for the premise that discrimination in ho-
tels and restaurants did substantially affect interstate commerce.
The two principal cases deciding the constitutionality of Title II of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 were Katzenbach v. McClung 2 ° and Heart of
Atlanta Motel v. United States. 2' In both, the Court upheld the enact-
ments, deciding that Congress "had a rational basis for finding that racial
discrimination in restaurants had a direct and adverse effect on the free
flow of interstate commerce" 122 and that "the power of Congress to pro-
mote interstate commerce also includes the power to regulate the local
incidents thereof, including local activities in both the States of origin
and destination, which might have a substantial and harmful effect upon
that commerce."' 123
116. See id. at 147-49.
117. See id. at 148. It is noteworthy and a bit ironic that, although the deliberation
concerning the post-Civil War Amendments focused on the Fourteenth Amendment, the
1968 case of Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), would later interpret the
Thirteenth Amendment as a source of legislative power that may well have been appro-
priate for the proposed 1964 legislation. See id. at 438-39 (noting that the Thirteenth
Amendment gave Congress the power to abolish all "badges and incidents" of slavery).
The Thirteenth Amendment, however, was "barely mentioned in the early 1960s de-
bates." See Gunther, supra note 11, at 148 n.1.
118. See Gunther, supra note 11, at 150-51.
119. See id. at 150. Notably, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 carried no formal congres-
sional findings, see Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 299 (1964), but unlike the
Gun-Free School Zones Act, had a legislative history "replete with testimony of the bur-
dens placed on interstate commerce by racial discrimination . . . ." See id.
120. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
121. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
122. Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 304.
123. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 258. One of the connections to interstate
commerce that the Court adopted in permitting Congress to reach local activities in the
state of destination of goods is that discrimination adversely affects the market for such
goods, thus adversely affecting interstate commerce. See id. By contrast, the argument
that possession of firearms in schools is an activity that may be regulated under the Com-
merce Clause because the firearms have moved in interstate commerce, see infra text
accompanying note 212 (subparagraphs (c) & (d) of the proposed amendment to the
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The Civil Rights Act cases were significant for two reasons. First, they
signaled a willingness on the part of the Court to apply the Wickard
rationale regarding the "aggregate effect of trivial instances" to legisla-
tion that had as its primary goal not economic concerns (as in Wickard)
but social ones.124 Second, the enactments were unaccompanied by for-
mal findings, which has led the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Edwards
to cite Katzenbach as authority for the proposition that formal findings
are unnecessary when Congress seeks to ground new areas of federal reg-
ulation of intrastate activities in the Commerce Clause.125 But the Civil
Rights Act cases can be readily distinguished. While the Gun-Free
School Zones Act had neither formal findings nor a significant legislative
history indicating congressional inquiry into the proposed commerce
nexus, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was one of the best examples of con-
gressional inquiry into the constitutional bases for enactment that has
occurred in our history. For this reason, as explored in Part III, the
precedential value of Katzenbach in support of the proposition that the
absence of formal findings has no impact on an enactment's presumed
constitutionality is questionable.
Before turning to an examination of the "findings" issue, however, it
would be well to complete this historical sketch of the development of
Gun-Free School Zones Act), does not rely on any such premise that the proposed regu-
lation would remedy some adverse effect on interstate commerce. The proposition that
Congress may reach any local activity merely because the instrumentalities related to that
activity have once moved in interstate commerce has been recently (and sharply) rejected
by one federal district court: "[I]f it is sufficient to invoke the powers of the Commerce
Clause that something has been manufactured outside the state ... and previously trans-
ported [t]here, 90% of the merchandise on every merchant's shelf will qualify and any
robbery of any store can be federalized by the Congress under this rationale." United
States v. Cortner, 834 F. Supp. 242, 243 (M.D. Tenn. 1993).
124. There can be no doubt that the political motivation to enact Title II of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 came from social concerns and not from a fear that discrimination in
the targeted establishments was ruining the national economy. Indeed, the very degree to
which the source of legislative authority was deliberated by Congress suggests an aware-
ness that the legislation represented a novel application of the commerce power even in
the wake of the New Deal cases. That there was concern about using the commerce
power disingenuously is reflected in the following statement by Senator Cooper of
Kentucky:
I do not suppose that anyone would seriously contend that the administration is
proposing legislation [because] it has suddenly determined [that] segregation is
a burden on interstate commerce. We are considering legislation because we
believe [that] all citizens have an equal right to have access to goods, services,
and facilities which are held out to be available for public use and patronage. If
there is a right to the equal use of accommodations held out to the public, it is
[a] constitutional right under the 14th amendment. It has nothing to do with
whether a business is in interstate commerce or whether discrimination against
individuals places a burden on commerce. It does not depend on the commerce
clause and cannot be limited by that clause ....
Gunther, supra note 11, at 151 n.5 (quoting Senate Hearings on Civil Rights Act of 1964
(statement of Sen. Cooper)).
125. See United States v. Edwards, 13 F.3d 291, 293-95 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing Katzen-
bach, 379 U.S. at 299).
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the contemporary scope of the commerce power by examining two cases
from the 1970s. Although even the broad commerce power of today will
have to be extended a bit further to sustain legislation such as the Gun-
Free School Zones Act, the Civil Rights Act cases provided an important
link between the New Deal line of cases and the current interpretation of
the Commerce Clause. The next link would be developed in less than a
decade.
D. The 1970s: Perez and Bass
Like Katzenbach, the 1971 case of Perez v. United States2 6 was cited
by the Edwards court in support of the proposition that "Congress need
not make particularized findings in order to legislate."' 127 Unlike Katzen-
bach, Perez involved legislation that was arguably directly related to con-
gressional concerns about commerce-related activity. At issue in Perez
was whether Title II of the Consumer Credit Protection Act 128 was, as
applied to the defendant-petitioner, "a permissible exercise by Congress
of its powers under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution."' 129 This
enactment, again in contrast to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (and to the
Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990), included formal findings by Con-
gress establishing a nexus between the regulated activity (extortionate
credit transactions or "loan sharking") and interstate commerce. 130
After first tracing the development of Commerce Clause jurisprudence
from Gibbons through Darby and Wickard,131 to the Civil Rights Act
cases of Heart of Atlanta Motel and Katzenbach,132 the Perez opinion
concluded by holding that Congress, having rationally decided that loan
sharking is a crime that may substantially affect interstate commerce,
acted within its constitutional power. 133 Given the precedents upon
which the Perez Court could rely, this was unsurprising, 134 especially
126. 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
127. See Edwards, 13 F.3d at 294-95 (quoting Perez, 402 U.S. at 156); see also infra
part III.A (discussing the "findings" issue).
128. Consumer Credit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146, 159-64 (1968)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 891-96 (1988)).
129. Perez, 402 U.S. at 146-47.
130. See id. at 147-48 n.1. One commentator noted shortly after Perez was decided
that "[n]o connection between the particular offense and interstate commerce was re-
quired, though :.. . the congressional findings baldly stated that there was such a connec-
tion." Stem, supra note 11, at 276.
131. See Perez, 402 U.S. at 150-51. Once again, Perez reiterated the notion that Wick-
ard "restored" the commerce power to its "broader view.., announced by Chief Justice
Marshall." See Perez, 402 U.S. at 151. That oft-repeated notion, however, is not the only
viewpoint. See supra notes 55-63 and accompanying text (discussing and supporting the
alternative position that it was the New Deal decisions that departed from the Gibbons
view).
132. See Perez, 402 U.S. at 153.
133. See id. at 154-55.
134. One commentator noted shortly after Perez was decided that the case "apparently
surprised no one." See Stem, supra note 11, at 284. Interestingly, the article went on to
note:
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since the crime involved was, as mentioned above, arguably commercial
in nature. But Justice Stewart, in lone dissent, indicated an awareness
that the rationale being developed could be applied to other intrastate
crime as well:
I think the Framers of the Constitution never intended that the Na-
tional Government might define as a crime and prosecute such wholly
local activity through the enactment of federal criminal laws.
In order to sustain this law we would, in my view, have to be able at
the least to say that Congress could rationally have concluded that
loan sharking is an activity with interstate attributes that distinguish it
in some substantial respect from other local crime. But it is not
enough to say that loan sharking is a national problem, for all crime is
a national problem. It is not enough to say that some loan sharking
has interstate characteristics, for any crime may have an interstate set-
ting. And the circumstance that loan sharking has an adverse impact
on interstate business is not a distinguishing attribute, for interstate
business suffers from almost all criminal activity, be it shoplifting or
violence in the streets.
Because I am unable to discern any rational distinction between loan
sharking and other local crime, I cannot escape the conclusion that
this statute was beyond the power of Congress to enact. The definition
and prosecution of local, intrastate crime are reserved to the States
under the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.135
If Justice Stewart's observation is correct that loan sharking, despite
its arguably commercial attributes, is indistinguishable from other local
crime (such as possession of guns on school grounds), then it is certainly
true that Perez opened the door to an unlimited federal criminal jurisdic-
tion that may reach any intrastate activity.1 36 One cannot help thinking,
though, that the majority could not have intended that consequence.137
Very shortly after Perez was decided, another federal criminal provi-
sion relying on the commerce power was tested in United States v.
Bass.' 38 At issue was an enactment particularly germane here: a provi-
The absence of comment upon or objection to the decision may attest to the
fact that prior decisions had long prepared the public and the bar for such a
conclusion--or perhaps prove merely that loan-sharking has little editorial,
scholarly or public support. And the same is probably true as to possession of
firearms by convicted felons. There might, of course, be more objection if the
possession of all firearms were prohibited, even though that could be thought to
be an even more effective way to reduce crimes which affect interstate
commerce.
l
135. Perez, 402 U.S. at 157-58 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
136. Judge Hays, dissenting from the court of appeals decision, expressed misgivings
about precisely this possibility: "If extortionate conduct unrelated to interstate com-
merce can be made a federal crime, so can such crimes as robbery, burglary, and lar-
ceny." United States v. Perez, 426 F.2d 1073, 1082 (2d Cir. 1970) (Hays, J., dissenting).
137. See infra notes 244-47 and accompanying text (interpreting Perez in light of both
the majority's and the dissent's opinions).
138. 404 U.S. 336 (1971).
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sion of Title VII of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968139 that imposed penalties on any felon who "receives, possesses, or
transports in commerce or affecting commerce ... any firearm."'"4 Be-
cause the statutory language was ambiguous as to whether the commerce
element ("in commerce or affecting commerce") applied to "receives"
and "possesses" as well as "transports" (the defendant having been in-
dicted for simple possession), and because the Court recognized that
criminalizing simple intrastate possession may exceed Congress's com-
merce power, 4' it construed the statute narrowly under the rule of
lenity:1 42
[U]nless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to
have significantly changed the federal-state balance. Congress has tra-
ditionally been reluctant to define as a federal crime conduct readily
denounced as criminal by the States .... [Therefore] we will not be
quick to assume that Congress has meant to effect a significant change
in the sensitive relation between federal and state criminal
jurisdiction. 143
Interestingly, the Second Circuit's opinion in Bass had stated: "An
interpretation of the statute that would allow prosecution for receipt or
possession of firearms without a showing in each case that such receipt or
possession was in or affecting interstate commerce would be an unprece-
dented extension of federal power." 14
The Supreme Court thus affirmed the Second Circuit's reversal of the
defendant's conviction without reaching the primary issue that the Lopez
and Edwards decisions have necessitated its addressing in the next
Term.'45 The Court noted that, "[i]n light of our disposition of the case,
we do not reach the question whether, upon appropriate findings, Con-
gress can constitutionally punish the 'mere possession' of firearms." 46 It
is significant that, in deferring on the issue, the Court used language indi-
cating that "appropriate findings"' 47 would be a minimal requirement to
139. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Title VII, Pub. L. No. 90-
351, 82 Stat. 197 (1968). The relevant provisions of this enactment were subsequently
repealed, but were originally codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1203. See Lopez, 2 F.3d at
1347, 1352.
140. 18 U.S.C. § 1202(a) (repealed 1986).
141. See Bass, 404 U.S. at 348-49. The Court specifically refrained from reaching the
question of whether Congress could punish simple intrastate possession of firearms. See
id. at 339 n.4.
142. See Edwards, 13 F.3d at 292 (explaining Bass).
143. Bass, 404 U.S. at 349 (emphasis added) (citations and footnotes omitted). It
seems reasonable to conclude, based on the fact that the Gun-Free School Zones Act was
passed, that Congress has since abandoned its "traditional reluctan[ce] to define as a
federal crime conduct readily denounced by the States." Id. at 349.
144. United States v. Bass, 434 F.2d 1296, 1300 (2d Cir. 1970).
145. Nor did the appeal from a subsequent conviction under the same statute as in
Bass decide the issue, since it was not raised on appeal. See Scarborough v. United States,
431 U.S. 563 (1977); see also Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1347 (discussing Bass and Scarborough).
146. Bass, 404 U.S. at 339 n.4 (emphasis added).
147. Id.
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Congress's constitutionally reaching such "mere possession."148
III. FINDINGS
When Congress uses the Commerce Clause as a constitutional grant of
power to enact legislation regulating an intrastate activity, it often makes
findings of fact regarding the relationship between the proposed regu-
lated activity and interstate commerce. For example, in enacting the
Controlled Substances Act, 149 Congress found, among other things, that
"[a] major portion of the traffic in controlled substances flows through
interstate and foreign commerce[,] ' ' 50 and that "[l]ocal distribution and
possession of controlled substances contribute to swelling the interstate
traffic in such substances."' 1 Simply because Congress has made formal
findings in the past, however, does not establish that it must do so in the
future.
A. Are Congressional Findings Necessary?
Perhaps the most salient point of divergence between the Fifth and
Ninth Circuits concerns the issue of whether, in areas of legislation in
which the connection to or effect on interstate commerce is not obvious
or well established, Congress must 52 make express findings that establish
a nexus between the activity sought to be regulated and interstate com-
merce, at least in the absence of a legislative history or a commerce ele-
ment that would, alternatively, establish such a nexus. 153 Probably the
reason that this area of inquiry assumed so much importance is that the
Supreme Court has clearly delineated the role of the lower courts in de-
ciding issues relating to the scope of the commerce power:
The task of a court that is asked to determine whether a particular
exercise of congressional power is valid under the Commerce Clause is
relatively narrow. The court must defer to a congressionalfinding that
148. See id
149. Pub. L. No. 91-513, Title II, 84 Stat. 1236, 1242 (1970) (codified as amended at
scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
150. 84 Stat. 1242 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 801(3) (1988)).
151. 84 Stat. 1242 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 801(4) (1988)). Interestingly, the Lopez
court noted that, unlike the proscription of narcotics possession as a means to regulate
intrastate trafficking therein, there has been no prior federal enactment "outlawing...
the possession of ordinary firearms by ordinary citizens." Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1367 n.51.
This point was made in support of the premise that the Gun-Free School Zones Act
differs markedly from prior federal firearms legislation. See infra text accompanying
notes 161-67. The Lopez court further noted that "firearms do not have the fungible and
untraceable characteristics of narcotics." Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1367 n.51. Thus, the effect of
intrastate possession of drugs on the interstate trafficking therein is not necessarily com-
parable to the situation with firearms.
152. It is recognized that basic separation-of-powers principles would be at odds with
the judiciary unqualifiedly dictating how Congress is to legislate. "Must," as used in this
context in the text, therefore, may be read as: "must, in order to support a presumption
of constitutionality under the Commerce Clause."
153. Compare United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1363-65 (arguing that findings are
necessary) with United States v. Edwards, 13 F.3d 291, 293-95 (contra).
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a regulated activity affects interstate commerce, if there is any rational
basis for such a finding.' 54
Accordingly, the Lopez court, noting that there had been no "congres-
sional finding"' 55 to which to defer,' 5 6 did not reach the issue of whether
Congress may have had a rational basis and instead simply held that
Congress had not done what was necessary to ground the Gun-Free
School Zones Act in the Commerce Clause. 5 7 The Ninth Circuit in Ed-
wards, however, responded by taking the position that "it is unnecessary
for Congress to make express findings that a particular activity or class of
activities affects interstate commerce in order to exercise its legislative
authority pursuant to the Commerce Clause."' 5 8 The Edwards court fur-
ther observed that, since Congress has repeatedly "relied upon the Com-
merce Clause as authority"' 59 for federal gun legislation, it is even less
subject to any requirement that may exist regarding formal findings.' 6
By contrast, the Fifth Circuit's lengthy Lopez opinion reviewed all pre-
viously enacted federal gun control legislation, beginning with the Na-
tional Firearms Act of 1934,161 in an effort to demonstrate that virtually
all prior enactments either included findings of an express nexus to inter-
state commerce,' 62 included a commerce element, 63 or regulated inter-
state transport of firearms or commercial transactions involving them.'I 4
The Gun-Free School Zones Act, by contrast, prohibits simple intrastate
possession and contains neither a commerce element nor formal or infor-
mal findings of a nexus to commerce.' 65 Thus, according to the Fifth
Circuit, the Act "represents a sharp break with the long-standing pattern
of Federal firearms legislation."' 16 6 The nexus to interstate commerce,
therefore, is neither readily apparent nor established by the earlier federal
gun control enactments:
Both the management of education, and the general control of simple
firearms possession by ordinary citizens, have traditionally been a state
154. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276 (1981)
(emphasis added).
155. Id.
156. See Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1366.
157. See id. at 1368.
158. Edwards, 13 F.3d at 293 (reiterating the holding in United States v. Evans, 928
F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1991)).
159. Edwards, 13 F.3d at 294.
160. See id. at 293-94.
161. See Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1348-60.
162. See id. at 1347.
163. See id.; see also supra note 36 and accompanying text (defining and discussing the
term "element").
164. See Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1348 (citing United States v. Nelson, 458 F.2d 556, 559 (5th
Cir. 1972) for the proposition that acquisition and sale of firearms is more closely related
to interstate commerce than is mere possession).
165. See Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1366; see also supra notes 24, 35-36 and accompanying text
(discussing the lack of a commerce element in the Gun-Free School Zones Act and the
testimony of BATF officials on this subject).
166. Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1366 (footnote omitted).
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responsibility, and section 922(q) indisputably represents a singular in-
cursion by the Federal Government into territory long occupied by the
States. In such a situation where we are faced with competing consti-
tutional concerns, the importance of Congressional findings is surely
enhanced.1 67
The Lopez court explicitly recognized that, "[w]here Congress has
made findings, formal or informal, that regulated activity substantially
affects interstate commerce, the courts must defer 'if there is any rational
basis for' the finding."' 168  But the court then stated that, although
"[c]ongressional enactments are. . . presumed constitutional[,] ... in
certain areas the presumption has less force." 169 Citing to the famous
Carolene Products footnote,17 0 the Lopez court posited that the Gun-Free
School Zones Act, as a further expansion of the commerce power, con-
flicts with the Tenth Amendment and with the structural principles of
federalism reflected therein.17 1  The court reasoned that the Tenth
Amendment is, "after all, as much a part of the Bill of Rights as the
First." 72 Because Congress has failed to demonstrate a constitutional
basis for an enactment that conflicts with the Tenth Amendment, the
statute is not entitled to the presumption of constitutionality that would
otherwise be the case.'
17
The Fifth Circuit drew support for its conclusion concerning the im-
portance of congressional findings from "recent holdings that when Con-
gress wishes to stretch its commerce power so far as to intrude upon state
prerogatives, it must express its intent to do so in a perfectly clear fash-
ion."" The cases cited, while each distinguishable from Lopez,' none-
167. Id. at 1364.
168. Id at 1363 (citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452
U.S. 264, 276 (1981)). The "rational basis for" language, as noted, see supra text accom-
panying note 154, was probably what led the Lopez court to focus on the issue of findings.
169. Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1364 (citing United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144,
152-53 n.4 (1938)).
170. United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938)
171. See Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1364; see also supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text
(discussing the relationship between the Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment).
The following passage from the Carolene Products footnote is quoted in Lopez: "'There
may be a narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legis-
lation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as
those of the first ten Amendments ....' Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1364 (quoting Carolene Prod-
ucts, 304 U.S. at 152-53 n.4). Interestingly, another well-respected authority, describing
this paragraph from the Carolene Products footnote as "pure interpretivism," argues that,
because "there are provisions in the Constitution that call for more," the footnote in its
entirety can be seen as a call for the application of constitutional structural protections to
judicial review. See Ely, supra note 46, at 76. The specific prohibition with which the
Gun-Free School Zones Act conflicts is the Tenth Amendment. See Lopez, 2 F.3d at
1364. That amendment, in turn, reflects the structural protections inherent in a design of
a federal government of limited powers. See supra notes 43-48. Therefore, the Lopez
reliance on the Carolene Products language would seem to be supported by Professor
Ely's interpretation of that footnote.
172. Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1364 (footnote omitted).
173. See i
174. Id. at 1365 (citing Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989) (plurality
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theless do stand for the proposition for which they were cited, i.e., that
"Congress' power to use the Commerce Clause in such a way as to impair
a State's sovereign status, and its intent to do so, are related inquiries."' 17 6
Lopez is without direct support, however, for the existence of any clear
requirement that Congress must 177 make formal findings when it uses the
Commerce Clause in such a way as to intrude into a new area of tradi-
tional states' domain, as has arguably occurred under the Gun-Free
School Zones Act. The opinion acknowledged that, as articulated in
Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co.,178 "'the constitutionality of action taken
by Congress does not depend on recitals of the power which it under-
takes to exercise.' ",179 But Lopez then pointed out that the quoted lan-
guage from Woods was therein immediately followed by a recognition
that the legislative history had provided an alternative means of Con-
gress's intent to invoke the war power.1 80 Thus, the situation in Woods
differs from Lopez in that the Gun-Free School Zones Act includes
neither express findings nor an alternative legislative history demonstrat-
ing that the Commerce Clause was being invoked.' 8'
More recent authority than Woods, though, has been cited by the
Ninth Circuit in support of its position that Congress need not make
particularized findings that an activity affects interstate commerce in or-
der to enact legislation regulating that activity."'2 Of special relevance is
opinion); Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223 (1989); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 111 S. Ct. 2395
(1991)).
175. Union Gas involved the use of the commerce power to abrogate the sovereign
immunity of a state under the Eleventh Amendment. See 491 U.S. at 7. Dellm uth, de-
cided the same day, involved similar Eleventh Amendment issues. See 491 U.S. at 227.
Lastly, Gregory denied the power of a federal age discrimination statute to preempt a
provision of the Missouri Constitution that required mandatory retirement for state
judges at age seventy. See 111 S. Ct. at 2400-01. This last case, admittedly, involved a
considerably more direct invasion of states' rights than does the statute at issue in Lopez.
176. Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1365 (emphasis in original).
177. As mentioned, see supra note 152, "must," as used in this context, means "must,
in order to support a presumption of constitutionality." The judiciary's power to specify
the legislature's methods is, and should be, limited.
178. 333 U.S. 138 (1948).
179. Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1364 n.45 (quoting Woods, 333 U.S. at 144).
180. See Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1364 n.45 (citing Woods, 333 U.S. at 144).
181. See Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1364 n.45. Again, the statutory language in the Gun-Free
School Zones Act did not include a commerce element. See Edwards, 13 F.3d at 292-93;
see also supra note 36 (defining "element"). A commerce element may conceivably pro-
vide an alternative means by which Congress could establish a nexus to interstate com-
merce in lieu of formal findings or a legislative history that indicate a well-considered
intention to ground the enactment in the commerce power. See Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1347-48
(discussing another federal firearms provision that contains a commerce element). But
see United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 339 n.4 (1971) (implying, in a case in which a
commerce element was present in the statute under review, that formal findings may also
be necessary in order for Congress constitutionally to punish the "mere possession" of
firearms) (dictum); see also supra text accompanying notes 146-48 (discussing the Bass
language and its implications).
182. See Edwards, 13 F.3d at 294 (citing EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983);
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971);
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the 1971 case of Perez v. United States,18 3 seen earlier, " ' which has be-
come the focus of much intricate linguistic debate between the Edwards
and Lopez positions. While the Lopez opinion acknowledged in a foot-
note the language in Perez, "'We have mentioned in detail the economic,
financial, and social setting of the problem as revealed to Congress. We
do so not to infer that Congress need make particularized findings in
order to legislateL]' '"18 the same acknowledgement went on to note that
"[n]o citation of authority is given, nor is the meaning of the second
sentence entirely clear."' 86
The Ninth Circuit, however, found the meaning of the second sentence
"unambiguous" and, quoting it, left off the potentially confusing "do so
not to infer" language.s 7 The Edwards opinion then cited an additional
sentence from the same paragraph in Perez in an attempt to clarify the
Court's meaning: "'We relate the history of the Act in detail to answer
the impassioned plea of the [sic] petitioner that all that is involved in loan
sharking is a traditionally local activity.' "188 According to the Ninth
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); as well as Woods, 333 U.S. 138 (1948), as
consistent with the Ninth Circuit's own holding in United States v. Evans, 928 F.2d 858
(9th Cir. 1991), that Congress need not make particularized findings in order to legislate).
The value of all of these cases, however, as support for an actual Supreme Court holding
that findings are never required, is undermined by the fact that Congress, in enacting the
statute in question in each case, had clearly established a nexus between the activity regu-
lated and interstate commerce. See Wyoming, 460 U.S. at 231 n.3 (formal findings); Ful-
liove, 448 U.S. at 503 (Powell, ., concurring) (prior legislation in same subject area);
Perez, 402 U.S. at 147 n.1 (formal findings); Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 299-301 (extensive
legislative history including prolonged congressional hearings addressing the question of
the proposed legislation's constitutional basis).
183. 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
184. See supra part II.D.
185. Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1362 n.41 (quoting Perez, 402 U.S. at 156).
186. Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1362 n.41.
187. See Edwards, 13 F.3d at 295 (quoting Perez, 402 U.S. at 156). (The Ninth Cir-
cuit, however, quoted both sentences from Perez elsewhere in the opinion. See Edwards,
13 F.3d at 293.) Given that "infer" is frequently misused where "imply" is intended, it is
submitted that the second sentence is indeed confusing (although no inference nor any
implication concerning Justice Douglas's grammatical abilities is intended). Did the
Court mean that by its mention of the "economic, financial and social setting of the
problemL,]" there was no intent on the Court's part to draw any conclusions (i.e., infer
anything) about the need for findings, since the "problem as revealed to Congress" obvi-
ated the need therefor? Or did the Court simply wish to qualify its mention of the revela-
tion of these findings by stating that it did not wish to imply that findings are necessarily
required? Or was some other meaning intended? Perhaps the most reliable meaning that
may be extracted from this infamous "second sentence" is that the Court did not wish to
decide on the issue of findings in Perez.
188. Edwards, 13 F.3d at 295 (quoting Perez, 402 U.S. at 156-57). The full text of the
paragraph in question (as well as the brief one following it), which conclude the text of
the majority's opinion in Perez, appears below:
We have mentioned in detail the economic, financial, and social setting of the
problem as revealed to Congress. We do so not to infer that Congress need
make particularized findings in order to legislate. We relate the history of the
Act in detail to answer the impassioned plea of petitioner that all that is in-
volved in loan sharking is a traditionally local activity. It appears, instead, that
loan sharking in its national setting is one way organized interstate crime holds
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Circuit, this meant that "[t]he Supreme Court explained that it had set
forth the legislative facts solely to respond to counsel's 'impassioned
plea.' ""9 The Edwards opinion then referred to the "Supreme Court's
holding in Perez" (one that the court implied may be extracted from a
careful reading of these sentences at the end of the Perez opinion), 190 a
"holding" to which, said the Ninth Circuit, the conclusion in Lopez is
"squarely contrary.""19  But the language of the "second sentence," aside
from being ambiguous, is merely dictum, since the Court's decision in the
case did not depend on whether Congress had made express findings. 192
Further, what the Edwards court would seem to be proposing is that, in
Commerce Clause cases, courts must not only defer to congressional
findings that a regulated activity affects interstate commerce, as required
under Hodel,1 93 but that courts must actually speculate as to whether
Congress could rationally have made such findings even when it has
failed to do so.
The debate over the meaning of the Perez language and its precedential
value on the question of findings was mentioned in United States v.
Trigg, 1 94 a District of Kansas opinion that found the Gun-Free School
Zones Act unconstitutional and dismissed an indictment thereunder: 195
The Ninth Circuit's disagreement with the Fifth Circuit rests on its
conflicting interpretation of Perez and the necessity for express con-
gressional findings that an activity affects interstate commerce. Ac-
cording to the Ninth Circuit, where Congress, in the course of
adopting earlier legislation[,] has found that the activity sought to be
regulated affects interstate commerce, additional hearings and findings
on this question are unnecessary.
With due respect to the Ninth Circuit, the court finds the views ar-
ticulated by the Fifth Circuit to be more faithful to the values of feder-
alism embodied in our Constitution. The court cannot agree with the
Ninth Circuit's statement that the Fifth Circuit's holding in Lopez is
squarely contrary to the Supreme Court's holdings in Perez and Katzen-
its guns to the heads of the poor and the rich alike and syphons funds from
numerous localities to finance its national operations.
Affirmed.
Perez, 402 U.S. at 156-57.
189. Edwards, 13 F.3d at 295.
190. See id. The full text of the language at the end of the Perez opinion appears supra
note 188.
191. Edwards, 13 F.3d at 295.
192. Similarly, in the other cases cited by the Ninth Circuit in support of the premise
that findings are not required, Congress had established a nexus to interstate commerce
by other means, or even by means of formal findings. See supra note 182.
193. See supra note 154 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's state-
ment in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981),
regarding the role of the lower courts in deciding Commerce Clause cases).
194. 842 F. Supp. 450 (D. Kan. 1994).
195. See id. at 452-53. It is noteworthy that, exactly one week after the Trigg decision,
the opposite result regarding the Act's constitutionality was reached in the same district.
See United States v. Glover, 842 F. Supp. 1327 (D. Kan. 1994). Even more ironic is that
the two defendants, Glover and Trigg, were arrested together. See id. at 1328 n. 1.
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bach. As the Fifth Circuit noted in footnote 41 of its opinion, the stat-
ute at issue in Perez reflects extensive consideration of and reliance on
the evidence before Congress, the legislative history, as well as the for-
mal [c]ongressional findings. In stark contrast, the congressional re-
ports and legislative history make no reference to the impact upon
commerce of firearms in schools.
196
Similar commentary appears in United States v. Glover,19" another Dis-
trict of Kansas case that decided the same issue a week later (albeit with
opposite results, holding § 922(q) constitutional and denying a motion to
dismiss). 198 There, the court observed: "I find the reasoning of the
Ninth Circuit persuasive, although I do not join in that circuit's rebuke
of the Fifth Circuit. The Perez decision is open to more than one
interpretation. " 99
Perhaps the best conclusion that can be drawn about the need for find-
ings is that no conclusion can be drawn. No firm Supreme Court prece-
dent decides the issue. Edwards, as has been seen,2° went to great
lengths to extract a decision on the issue from Perez, but the language
there is ambiguous and, as has been suggested,20 1 probably best supports
the proposition that the Supreme Court did not wish to decide the issue
in that case at all. Similarly, all the other cases mentioned in Edwards as
supporting the premise that Congress need not make particularized find-
ings involve statutes in which a nexus to commerce had been established
by other means.2 02 Thus, in the final analysis, it would seem that the
Supreme Court has yet to decide the following question:
When Congress enacts a statute regulating non-commercial intra-
state activity and having no constitutional basis other than the Com-
merce Clause, and where neither the legislative history of the
enactment, a commerce element, nor prior legislation in the same sub-
ject area establishes a nexus between the regulated activity and inter-
state commerce, must Congress make express findings of such a nexus
in order for the statute to enjoy a presumption of constitutionality?
There is hope, though, that when Lopez is reviewed by the Supreme
Court, a clearly articulated standard relating the presence or absence of
congressional findings to the presumed constitutionality of legislation en-
acted under the commerce power may emerge. Arguably, such a stan-
196. Trigg, 842 F. Supp. at 452 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
197. 842 F. Supp. 1327 (D. Kan. 1994).
198. See id. at 1336-37.
199. Id. at 1336 (emphasis added). Although the court noted that the Perez language
is open to more than one interpretation, it found the Tenth Circuit's own position (citing
Morgan v. Secretary of Hous. & Urban Dev., 985 F.2d 1451, 1455 (10th Cir. 1993)) to be
more compatible with that of the Ninth Circuit, and ruled accordingly. See Glover, 842
F. Supp. at 1336-37.
200. See supra notes 187-92 and accompanying text.
201. See supra note 187 and text accompanying note 192.
202. See supra note 182. But in deference to the Ninth Circuit it must be reiterated
that the Edwards court was relying primarily on the Ninth Circuit's own precedent in
United States v. Evans, 928 F.2d 858 (1991). See Edwards, 13 F.3d at 293.
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dard should take into account the justifiable concern that Congress may
be less than diligent in ascertaining a proposed enactment's constitu-
tional basis, especially when under intense political pressure to provide a
solution to a problem publicly perceived to require a federal remedy.2 °3
As Judge Acker of the Northern District of Alabama noted, in his opin-
ion granting a motion for dismissal of an indictment under the Gun-Free
School Zones Act, that enactment seems to indicate a tendency for the
legislative branch to "expect[ ] courts invariably to presume that Con-
gress intends to hang any and all new federal legislation which purports
to control activity within the several states on the so-called Commerce
Clause, without Congress having to say so."2 " The Lopez position,
which would encourage Congress to "say so," seems the better one, if
only because findings are not much to ask for when a Constitution is at
stake.
B. On Finding Findings: The Proposed Amendment to § 922(q)
The Lopez opinion carefully avoided addressing the question of
whether the Act would be held constitutional given congressional find-
ings showing a nexus to commerce, 20 5 although the opinion did note that,
in the past fifty years, the Supreme Court has never set aside such find-
ings as being without a rational basis.2 6 The Fifth Circuit thus left room
for the argument that, given a clear expression by Congress of its intent
to ground the Gun-Free School Zones Act in the Commerce Clause, the
Act could be held constitutional. 20 7 The Lopez opinion went on to add:
203. This was precisely the case with the Gun-Free School Zones Act. There is, and
should be, overwhelming popular support for measures directed at solving the problem of
violence in our schools. But the curious absence of findings or of a significant legislative
history linking this violence to interstate commerce, together with the fact that testimony
questioning the Act's constitutionality was given before the House Subcommittee, see
supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text, all point to a conscious choice, at least on the
part of some legislators, to ignore the constitutional implications of the measure in order
to hasten its enactment.
204. United States v. Morrow, 834 F. Supp. 364, 365 (N.D. Ala. 1993). This opinion
was written before the Ninth Circuit decided Edwards. Judge Acker was thus denied the
opportunity to respond to that decision's holding that Congress need not make particu-
larized findings.
205. See Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1368 ("Whether with adequate Congressional findings or
legislative history, national legislation of similar scope could be sustained, we leave for
another day.").
206. See id. at 1363 n.43; cf supra text accompanying note 154 (noting, and comment-
ing on, the Court's "rational basis" standard for assessing the constitutionality of enact-
ments based on congressional findings that the regulated activity substantially affects
interstate commerce).
207. The Lopez court does seem to take the position, though, that the commerce power
is not broad enough to provide a constitutional basis for the Gun-Free School Zones Act.
See Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1361 ("Broad as the commerce power is, its scope is not unlimited,
particularly where intrastate activities are concerned.") But the Lopez opinion focuses on
the absence of both formal and informal findings, see supra note 18, to provide a firm
basis for its decision. See Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1368 ("Here we merely hold that Congress has
not done what is necessary to locate section 922(q) within the Commerce Clause.").
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[W]e expressly do not resolve the question whether section 922(q) can
ever be constitutionally applied. Conceivably, a conviction under sec-
tion 922(q) might be sustained if the government alleged and proved
that the offense had a nexus to commerce.20 8
Presumably even more conducive to upholding the Gun-Free School
Zones Act, although not expressly mentioned in Lopez, would be formal
findings enacted "retroactively." And, indeed, such a modification to the
Act may yet occur. Subsequent to the Lopez decision, the court in
United States v. Glover,2' the District of Kansas opinion that found the
Act constitutional and denied a motion to dismiss an indictment thereun-
der,210 noted that "[i]n the fall of 1993, perhaps in response to the Lopez
decision, an amendment to the Gun-Free School Zones Act explicitly
setting forth such findings was introduced in both the House of Repre-
sentatives and the Senate." '' The proposed amendment inserts into sec-
tion 922(q) a new paragraph (1):
The Congress finds and declares that-
(a) Crime, particularly crime involving drugs and guns, is a perva-
sive, nationwide problem;
(b) Crime at the local level is exacerbated by the interstate move-
ment of drugs, guns, and criminal gangs;
(c) Firearms and ammunition move easily in interstate commerce
and have been found in increasing numbers in and around schools, as
documented in numerous hearings in both the Judiciary Committee of
the House of Representatives and Judiciary Committee of the Senate;
(d) In fact, even before the sale of a firearm, the gun, its component
parts, ammunition, and the raw materials from which they are made
have considerably moved in interstate commerce;
(e) While criminals freely move from state to state, ordinary citizens
and foreign visitors may fear to travel to or through certain parts of the
country due to concern about violent crime and gun violence, and par-
ents may decline to send their children to school for the same reason;
(f) The occurrence of violent crime in school zones has resulted in a
decline in the quality of education in our country;
(g) This decline in the quality of education has an adverse impact on
interstate commerce and the foreign commerce of the United States;
(h) States, localities, and school systems that have made strong ef-
forts to prevent, detect, and punish gun-related crime find their efforts
unavailing due in part to the failure or inability of other states or local-
ities to take strong measures; and
(i) Congress has power, under the Interstate Commerce Clause and
other provisions of the Constitution, to enact measures to ensure the
integrity and safety of the nation's schools by enactment of this
208. Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1368.
209. 842 F. Supp. 1327 (D. Kan. 1994). The "companion case" of United States v.
Trigg, decided a week earlier, is discussed supra note 195.
210. See Glover, 842 F. Supp. at 1336-37.
211. Md at 1334.
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subsection. 2 12
But Congress's recital of a nexus to interstate commerce, whether pre-
or post-enactment, does not necessarily end the inquiry and make the
statute constitutional. 213 As an initial consideration, there is the observa-
tion, perhaps first expressed in an 1849 Georgia case: "The legislature
has no power to legislate the truth of facts., 214 And one is reminded of
John Marshall's famous statement that,
should Congress, under the pretext of executing its powers, pass laws
for the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the government[,] it
would become the painful duty of this tribunal, should a case requiring
such a decision come before it, to say that such an act was not the law
of the land.215
Arguably, a general police power over intrastate matters has not yet
been entrusted to the federal government. Although the amendment bill
declares that Congress has such powers,216 this would appear to be an
issue that (at least until the limits of the commerce power are better ar-
ticulated) must be resolved on a case-by-case basis.217 Perhaps the most
convincing proposed nexus to interstate commerce in the amendment bill
is that possession of firearms in schools adversely affects education, and
that a decline in the quality of education, in turn, has an adverse effect on
interstate commerce.218 Yet, under this rationale, virtually any intrastate
activity occurring in a school would be within the reach of Congress to
regulate. To use an example that illustrates the absurdity of this ap-
proach, chewing gum in class could be made into a federal crime because
that activity adversely affects education.
212. Id. at 1333-34 n.13 (quoting S. 1607, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R. 3355,
103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993)).
213. There must be a "rational basis for such a finding" that the regulated activity
substantially affects interstate commerce. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Recla-
mation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276 (1981); see also supra text accompanying note 154 (dis-
cussing same). If the fact that guns have once moved in interstate commerce
(subparagraphs (c) and (d) of the amendment bill) is a sufficiently "rational basis," virtu-
ally any intrastate activity may be regulated. See supra note 123 (discussing one court's
treatment of this rationale, and differentiating the reasoning employed in the Civil Rights
Act cases).
214. Dougherty v. Bethune, 7 Ga. 90, 92 (Ga. 1849). The quotation has recently been
used in Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lashley, 335 S.E.2d 855, 857 (Ga. 1985), and has
been duplicated (although without a citation to its source) in Horace E. Read et al.,
Materials on Legislation 160 (4th ed. 1982), where, appropriately enough, it is included in
a section on the use of preambles in statutes "as an aid in establishing constitutionality."
See id.
215. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819) (emphasis added).
216. See supra text accompanying note 212 (proposed amendment, subparagraph (i)
(declaring that "Congress has power ... to enact measures to ensure the integrity and
safety of the nation's schools")).
217. See, e.g., Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 198 (1968) ("This Court has examined
and will continue to examine federal statutes to determine whether there is a rational
basis for regarding them as regulations of commerce among the states,").
218. See supra text accompanying note 212. The specific language referenced appears
at subparagraphs (f) and (g) of the proposed amendment.
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Whether or not Congress ever does adopt the proposed formal find-
ings, the deeper issues raised in these Gun-Free School Zones Act must
eventually be addressed. The constitutional grant of power contained in
the Commerce Clause is, at best, not clearly defined. The Court has now
been given the opportunity to outline the proper scope of the commerce
power, which, as noted at the outset, is widely perceived as being without
clearly articulated limits. 219
IV. ON LOSING FINDINGS
(AND FINDING THE LIMrrS OF THE COMMERCE POVER)
The Gun-Free School Zones Act, with or without formal findings of a
nexus to commerce, can only have been validly enacted under the Com-
merce Clause if the activity regulated (that is, firearms possession in and
around schools) substantially affects interstate commerce. °20 Wickard v.
Filburn2 1 would provide the primary support for a decision upholding
the Act on this basis, as the Lopez' opinion pointed out:
"But even if appellee's activity be local and though it may not be re-
garded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by
Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate com-
merce and irrespective of whether such effect is what might at some
earlier time have been defined as 'direct' or 'indirect.' "223
The Fifth Circuit further noted that the above passage from Wickard
has been "quoted with approval many times[,]" and cited Katzenbach
and Perez, among other cases, as examples." 4 But this is not to say that
Wickard means that any local activity may be regulated. Wickard may
indeed be read to mean that any intrastate activity that has a minimal or
"trivial" effect on interstate commerce is within the reach of Congress to
regulate, provided that the aggregate effect of such "trivial" instances is
substantial. But such a broad reading may be at odds with subsequent
interpretations of the case.225 In Maryland v. Wirtz, 26 Justice Harlan
219. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
220. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U.S. 1, 43 (1937) (holding that Congress may regulate intrastate activities that substan-
tially affect interstate commerce); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (holding that
even where the effect individual instances of such activities on interstate commerce is
"trivial," Congress may still regulate if the aggregate effect is substantial). But see Mary-
land v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 197 n.27 (1968) (explaining that Wickard did not mean that
Congress may use a relatively trivial impact on commerce as an excuse for broad general
regulation of intrastate activities); see also supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text
(commenting on the Wirtz explanation of Wickard).
221. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
222. United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 62 U.S.L.W.
3690 (U.S. Apr. 18, 1994) (No. 93-1260).
223. Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1361 (quoting Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125) (emphasis added in
Lopez).
224. See Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1361.
225. See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
226. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
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explained that, where a statute validly enacted pursuant to the Com-
merce Clause affected "individual instances falling within a rationally de-
fined class of activities[,]" '227 the Court could not "excise, as trivial" '228
those relatively minor instances affected by the statute. 229 This is, of
course, quite different from saying that Congress may regulate the "triv-
ial" activity as a primary object of the proposed regulation. In a foot-
note, the Wirtz opinion further clarified this proposition by noting that
[n]either here nor in Wickard has the Court declared that Congress
may use a relatively trivial impact on commerce as an excuse for broad
general regulation of state or private activities. The Court has said
only that where a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation
to commerce, the de minimis character of individual instances arising
under that statute is of no consequence.23
The Agricultural Adjustment Act, whose application to the appellee in
Wickard was challenged, was primarily aimed at wheat production for
commercial use. The Court, however, refused to exempt from the stat-
ute's control that portion of the appellee's crop that was for home use.23'
By contrast, the Gun-Free School Zones Act targets the individually
"trivial" activity itself-if that were to be "excised," no class remains
upon which it may operate. Put another way, the high school student
carrying a gun is a member of the primary class at which the Act is
directed, in contrast to the "home-growing" farmer who violates a
broader, commerce-regulating statute aimed at commercial wheat pro-
duction. Congress did not enact the Agricultural Adjustment Act pri-
marily to regulate the "trivial" activity of growing wheat for home use,
but it did enact the Gun-Free School Zones Act primarily to reach the
"trivial" (in terms of its effect on interstate commerce) activity of carry-
ing weapons on school grounds.
The Lopez court recognized that the Wirtz footnote qualified Wick-
ard,232 and went on to note that the requirement that interstate com-
merce be "substantially" affected by the proposed regulated activity is
constitutionally necessary, since the alternative would be to allow the
Commerce Clause to become a grant of unlimited legislative power.233
The Lopez opinion stopped short of concluding that Congress could have
had no rational basis for determining that the intrastate possession of
227. Id. at 193.
228. Id.
229. See id.
230. Id. at 197 n.27.
231. See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128-29. Borrowing the Wirtz language, see Wirtz, 392
U.S. at 193, 197 n.27, the Wickard Court would not "excise, as trivial," the appellee's "de
minimis" activity, i.e., the growing of wheat for home use, which violated the broader,
commerce-based regulation.
232. Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1362-62 (citing Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 196-97 n.27).
233. See Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1362 ("[I]f the reach of the commerce power to local activity
that merely affects interstate commerce or its regulation is not understood as being lim-
ited by some concept such as 'substantially' affects, then, contrary to Gibbons v. Ogden,
the scope of the Commerce Clause would be unlimited . . ").
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firearms in schools substantially affects interstate commerce,z 4 instead
focusing, as discussed earlier,2"' on the significance of Congress's failure
to have made formal findings in this regard.236
The Lopez court also noted "that the imprecise and matter of degree
nature of concepts such as 'substantially,' especially as applied to the ef-
fect on interstate commerce, generally renders decision making in this
area particularly within the province of Congress, rather than the
Courts." '237 It was further observed in Lopez that "the Supreme Court
has consistently deferred to Congressional findings in this respect
"238
But the time has come when deference must give way to decision. Un-
less the meaning of "substantial," as that term relates to Commerce
Clause jurisprudence, is given a clearer definition, there is a danger, as
Lopez warns, 239 that the commerce power will become the basis for the
assumption by Congress of unlimited legislative authority. Moreover,
the Court should address the disparity between the broad reading of
Wickard that would allow direct regulation of any "trivial" activity, and
the Wirtz explanation that implies that Wickard's holding is more cir-
cumscribed than would be consistent with the broader reading." ° It is
submitted that the narrower reading of Wickard is the valid one, if only
because the logical result of the broader interpretation would be that any
activity at all may be regulated, since everything affects commerce in
some way. 24' Because this result would be at odds with the Tenth
Amendment, the Wirtz interpretation must prevail.
Wickard is also distinguishable because the statute in question in that
case was generally aimed at the production of goods for the interstate
234. See supra text accompanying note 154 (discussing the "rational basis" standard of
review and the reasons that it may have led the Lopez court to focus on the absence of
findings).
235. See supra part III.
236. See Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1362-68.
237. Id at 1362. But see Epstein, supra note 9, at 1388 ("The commerce power...
does not convert the Constitution from a system of government with enumerated federal
powers into one in which the only subject matter limitations placed on Congress are those
which it chooses to impose on itself.").
238. Lopez, 2. F.3d at 1362. The tradition of deferring to congressional findings of a
nexus to interstate commerce seems to have had its origins, not surprisingly, during the
period of the commerce power's greatest expansion:
It is noticeable that all the key New Deal commerce clause opinions took the
substantive findings of Congress at face value. None was prepared to identify
the powerful interest group politics that were so evident in both the labor and
agricultural cases-the very policy areas in which the commerce clause reached
its present scope.
Epstein, supra note 9, at 1451.
239. See Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1362.
240. See supra note 112 and text accompanying notes 225-32.
241. The Lopez opinion expresses this concept: "[T]he chain of causation is virtually
infinite, and hence there is no private activity, no matter how local and insignificant, the
ripple effect from which is not in some theoretical measure ultimately felt beyond the
borders of the state in which it took place." Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1362.
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market, whereas the Gun-Free School Zones Act is, quite simply, the
creation of a federal crime. Put in its historical context, 242 it would seem
that the holding in Wickard could not have contemplated application of
its modified "affecting commerce" rationale to the broader federal crimi-
nal arena, especially given that it was not until Perez that such an exten-
sion of the doctrine was given the Court's explicit approval.243
Regarding Perez, a reading of both the majority and dissenting opin-
ions in that case would indicate that the Court was distinguishing loan
sharking from other local crime in finding federal regulation of the for-
mer constitutionally permissible under the commerce power. Indeed, the
majority concluded that "loan sharking in its national setting is one way
organized interstate crime holds its guns to the heads of the poor and
rich alike and syphons funds from numerous localities to finance its na-
tional operations." 2' This implies that the intrastate crime of loan
sharking is different, in terms of its relationship to interstate commerce,
from most other intrastate criminal activities.245 As noted earlier,246 lan-
guage in the dissent also supports the premise that the majority was mak-
ing such a distinction, for Justice Stewart expressed doubts that the
majority's distinction between loan sharking and other local crime was a
valid one.247 If it is true that the Perez decision rested on such a distinc-
tion between local crime that has an interstate commercial character and
242. See supra part II.B-D.
243. See Perez, 402 U.S. at 151-52; see also supra notes 126-38 and accompanying text
(discussing Perez); Resch, supra note 11, at 813 ("[B]y the mid 1960's, the commerce
clause still had not been conceptually stretched in respect to federal criminal jurisdiction
beyond its 1930's status.... This state of affairs, however, soon changed with Congres-
sional passage of an anti-loan sharking statute."). The Perez Court noted, 402 U.S. at
152, that United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), involved a criminal prosecution.
But Darby, decided before Wickard, could not have extended the Wickard rationale.
244. Perez, 402 U.S. at 157.
245. The unique qualities of loan sharking that enabled it to be made a federal crime,
and the new constitutional questions that upholding the statute raised, drew commentary
by a law student shortly after Perez was decided:
Two circumstances combined in this case to make it an appropriate vehicle
for the Supreme Court to use in expanding the substantive scope of the com-
merce clause as it relates to criminal law. First, the act was passed in order to
curb those criminal activities which produce the revenue organized crime uses
to finance its interstate activities; and, though the criminal acts themselves may
be local, their impact is national. Second, the determination that loan sharking,
as a class, has sufficient interstate ties to justify federal regulation was made by
Congress as a result of substantial study.
Because these special circumstances were present in the loan-sharking situa-
tion, Perez left unanswered the question whether the Court, in the future, will
hold that customary crimes can be punished by the federal government though
in the individual case the conduct is unrelated in a substantial way to interstate
commerce.
Resch, supra note 11, at 816 (footnote omitted).
246. See supra notes 133-38 and accompanying text.
247. See Perez, 402 U.S. at 157 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("[T]he circumstance that loan
sharking has an adverse impact on interstate business is not a distinguishing attribute, for
interstate business suffers from almost all criminal activity .... ").
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local crime that does not, it is equally true that Perez does not directly
support a holding that the Gun-Free School Zones Act is a constitutional
application of the commerce power. Criminal extortionate credit trans-
actions have an obvious commercial character, but intrastate possession
of firearms does not. It is only by the most attenuated connections, such
as those recited in the proposed amendment to the Gun-Free School
Zones Act,24 8 that a nexus between interstate commerce and the regu-
lated activity could even be suggested. Upholding the Act on the basis of
such an attenuated nexus would effectively extend the Perez rationale to
any and all local crime, thus simultaneously validating Justice Stewart's
assertion and opening the door to a federal criminal jurisdiction of un-
precedented proportions.249
It is paradoxical that, in the hopes of bringing the power of the na-
tional government to bear on local crimes, Congress would seem to be
asking the nation's highest Court to disobey its highest law, the Constitu-
tion itself. In order to uphold the Gun-Free School Zones Act as a valid
exercise of the commerce power, the Court must construe the Commerce
Clause in a way that would conflict with the plain meaning of the text, as
well as with the provisions for a government of limited, enumerated pow-
ers expressed in the Tenth Amendment and elsewhere.
Such a construction appears less tortured to those who focus on prece-
dent rather than text because, as shown previously," s0 the commerce
power has undergone what can only be described as a radical expansion
during this century. Nevertheless, it does seem an affront to common
sense to propose that the phrase "[t]o regulate Commerce... among the
several States" '251 could have been ratified with the idea in mind that the
provision would one day be used as the basis for prohibiting the intra-
state possession of firearms on school grounds. It may be true, as Profes-
sor Ackerman has proposed, that the New Deal was one of three major
periods of "constitutional politics" in United States history (the other
two being the Founding and the Reconstruction) that fundamentally
changed the nature of the American Constitution, and that the expansion
of the power of the federal government that took place during that period
in the absence of any constitutional amendment was legitimized by virtue
of the intense political debate that shaped those changes. 2  But even
assuming this to be true, the popular support for the fundamental
changes that took place then cannot be assumed to have derived from the
same concerns that today are driving the expansion of the federal crimi-
248. See supra text accompanying note 212 (listing the formal findings that have been
proposed as an amendment to the Gun-Free School Zones Act).
249. See supra notes 136, 144 and accompanying text (discussing, respectively, the dis-
senting opinion of Judge Hays of the Second Circuit in the lower court's opinion in Perez,
and his majority opinion in United States v. Bass, 434 F.2d 1296, 1300 (2d Cir. 1970)).
250. See supra part II.
251. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
252. See Ackerman, supra note 41; see also supra note 42 (discussing this theory of
legitimacy and quoting from Professor Ackerman's work).
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nal jurisdiction.253 Thus, while a national government of expanded eco-
nomic powers may have been legitimized by immense popular
participation during the New Deal, an expanded federal criminal juris-
diction over intrastate matters traditionally under the states' regulation
was not. If the Great Depression led to a public outcry for central con-
trol of the economy, it does not follow that the precedent that gave that
expansion of the federal power constitutional acceptability must now be
extended beyond its original scope.
Judge Wiseman of the Middle District of Tennessee has commented
on the growth of the federal criminal jurisdiction and on the judiciary's
tendency to support it:
The Congress has had a recent penchant for passing a federal crimi-
nal statute on any well-publicized criminal activity. The courts, in an
obeisant deference to the legislative branch, have stretched the Com-
merce Clause of the Constitution beyond the wildest imagination of the
Framers and beyond any rational interpretation of the language it-
self.... The constant lament is that the constitutional concept of Fed-
eralism is being eviscerated by the Congress. The Congress is able to
do this, however, only because we in the judicial branch are willing to
interpret the Commerce Clause of the Constitution so broadly. 254
CONCLUSION
"[T]he only causes worth fighting for [a]re the lost causes.",255
During the latter part of the nineteenth and the early years of the
twentieth century, the Supreme Court did not seem as hesitant as it has
since become to strike down legislation that was beyond the power of
Congress to enact under the plain meaning of the Commerce Clause.256
Since that time, depending on one's viewpoint, the Court has either "re-
turned" the commerce power to the broad grant of congressional author-
ity that it once was, or, in the face of political and economic pressures to
create a more powerful central government than was contemplated by
the Framers, allowed the Commerce Clause to become the basis for such
253. On the political profitability of federalizing local crime and the pragmatic argu-
ments against doing so, see Naftali Bendavid, How Much More Can Courts, Prisons Take?
It's Tempting to Federalize Crimes, but Opponents Are Gathering Momentum, Legal
Times, June 7, 1993, at 1, 22-25. See also supra note 17 (offering a possible explanation
for the popular support for making local crime a federal concern: the perception that
federal prosecutions will not be burdened by state procedural protections). The debate
over federalizing local crime has also recently been addressed in Constance Johnson, Law
and Disorder: When Washington Takes on Crime, Its Bark Is Far Worse Than Its Bite,
U.S. News & World Report, Mar. 28, 1994, at 35-37.
254. United States v. Cortner, 834 F. Supp. 242, 244 (M.D. Tenn. 1993).
255. Mr. Smith Goes To Washington (Columbia Pictures 1939).
256. See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918); United States v. E.C.
Knight, 156 U.S. 1 (1895); United States v. Dewitt, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 41 (1869); see also
supra note 63 (discussing the significance of Dewitt).
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a creature. 257
If the latter is the more accurate depiction of the history of Commerce
Clause jurisprudence, there can be no doubt that this nation is nearing a
stage in its development that resembles the image alluded to in Jones &
Laughlin Steel,258 where the cumulative judicial, legislative, and even ex-
ecutive stretching of the limits of the commerce power will soon "effectu-
ally obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is local
and create a completely centralized government. 2 9
It is ironic that this warning should be found in the text of a case that
many regard as crucial in the development of the modern commerce
power.26 Were anyone to have asked a Supreme Court justice on the
day Jones & Laughlin Steel was decided whether the holding in that case
could be extended to permit the expansion of the federal criminal juris-
diction into intrastate matters traditionally under the states' exclusive
control, one can guess only that the answer would have been a resound-
ing "No!"
Thirty-four years later, in 1971, the Court was divided on the question
of whether loan sharking could be made a federal crime, with the major-
ity finding that the activity was sufficiently related to commerce to be
within the reach of Congress to regulate.2 61 Now, the Court is about to
consider the constitutionality of a statute that, if upheld, would strip
away what vestiges remain of the federal system envisaged by the Tenth
Amendment and by the original design of a federal government of lim-
ited powers. Although it may be true that those limited powers have
been expanded for legitimate reasons, the justifications for the expansion
of the commerce power following the Great Depression and the current
politically profitable trend of making local crime a federal concern are
simply not of the same order of magnitude. Further, the power that
Congress now seeks can and should be obtained through the process of
constitutional amendment.262
The Court should affirm Lopez, and should embrace the principle ar-
ticulated therein that the presumption of constitutionality applies with
less force to enactments having no readily apparent constitutional basis
257. See supra part II.B (discussing the beginnings of this transition during the New
Deal). The need to find a constitutional basis by which the federal government could
stabilize the national economy, though, is arguably more related to the Commerce Clause
than is the currently perceived "need" to permit federal policing of local crime that is a
"national" problem.
258. National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1
(1937).
259. Id at 37 (citations omitted). For a fuller quotation of this passage, see supra text
accompanying note 93.
260. It is undoubtedly to Jones & Laughlin Steel that Professor Currie refers when he
writes that "constitutional federalism had died in 1937." See Currie, supra note 69, at
238.
261. See supra text accompanying notes 244-47 (discussing Perez v. United States, 402
U.S. 146 (1971)).
262. See U.S. Const. art. V.
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other than in the commerce power and lacking any indication that Con-
gress intended to base the proposed legislation on the Commerce Clause.
Although some may feel that setting affirmative limits on the commerce
power at this late stage is a lost cause, it is nonetheless a cause worth
fighting for. To do otherwise, which would be to abandon the principle
of a federal government of limited powers, would be to abandon the Con-
stitution itself.
